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BELATED JUSTICE: THE FAILURES AND PROMISE OF
THE HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION ACT
Troy J.H. Andrade*
In July 1921, the United States Congress enacted and President Warren
G. Harding signed into law the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920,
establishing a land trust of approximately 203,500 acres of former Crown
and Government Lands to provide homestead leases at a nominal fee for
native Hawaiians, those individuals of fifty percent or more Hawaiian
blood. At present, the Hawaiian Homes Commission oversees the State of
Hawai‘i’s Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, which administers the
HHCA and manages the lands set aside for the program. Although steps
have been made to put beneficiaries on land, the history of the HHCA
demonstrates the failure of the federal and state governments to live up to
their promises of justice for Hawaiians.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ........................................................................................... 2
II. Land, Power, and the Guise of Rehabilitation: Analyzing the Origins
of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act ................................................... 6
A. Justifying the Seizure of Crown and Government Lands ................... 8
B. Racialization and the Division of Hawaiians ................................... 18
III. Enough Is Enough: Analyzing the Government’s Continued Breaches
of Trust ................................................................................................... 29
A. Resolving Breaches of Trust ........................................................... 35
1. Settling the State’s Pre-1988 Misuse of Trust Lands .................... 36
2. 1991 Individual Claims Resolution Under the Hawaiian Home
Lands Trust Act .............................................................................. 37
B. Insufficient Funding........................................................................ 44
IV. Belated Justice................................................................................... 53
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Ulu Lehua Scholars Program,
William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Ph.D. 2016,
University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. J.D. 2011, William S. Richardson School of Law,
University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. This Article is dedicated to the lawyers that have fought—
sometimes for decades—to ensure justice for Hawaiian homestead beneficiaries, including,
but not limited to, Thomas Grande, Robert “Gil” Johnston, Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie,
and Carl M. Varady.

1

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

2

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

I. Introduction
In the Hawaiian enclave of Waimānalo, Raymond Pae Galdeira, a native
son of that community, established a government funded program to keep
teens off the street and out of trouble. 1 This program—the Waimānalo Teen
Project—provided respite and safe activities for the predominantly
indigenous teens.2 One night, Galdeira took some of his teens “home” to a
collection of makeshift sheds at Waimānalo Beach Park.3 Because a storm
sent strong gusts of wind and consistent sprays of ocean water toward the
tent city, Galdeira and the teens ran to help hold down a family home on the
cusp of going airborne and flying into the ocean. 4 Galdeira saw his
students—these children—and their families struggling to live, not by
choice, on the beach.5 He saw these Kānaka Maoli families struggling to
survive in their own homelands and questioned how this could happen.6
Galdeira found an answer from Legal Aid volunteer Elizabeth Tuttle,
who had researched the state and federal governments’ consistent failures to
follow through with promises made to native Hawaiians under the 1921
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (“HHCA”).7 The HHCA—a federal law
incorporated into state law—set aside approximately 203,500 acres of
Kingdom of Hawai‘i Crown and Government Lands for those of at least
fifty percent Native Hawaiian blood. 8 The aim of the HHCA was to provide
a vehicle to “rehabilitate” the dying Native Hawaiian population through
the use of homesteads.9 The irony of the teens’ situation—Kānaka Maoli
1. Interview with Raymond Pae Galdeira, Founder, The Hawaiians, in Henderson,
Nev. (May 7, 2015) [hereinafter Galdeira Interview]; Troy J.H. Andrade, Hawai‘i ‘78:
Collective Memory and the Untold Legal History of Reparative Action for Kānaka Maoli, 24
U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 85 (2021) [hereinafter Andrade, Hawai‘i ‘78]. For purposes of
this Article, the terms “Native Hawaiian,” “Hawaiian,” and “Kānaka Maoli” will be used
interchangeably to refer to any individual of Hawaiian ancestry regardless of blood quantum.
See Troy J.H. Andrade, (Re)Righting History: Deconstructing the Court’s Narrative of
Hawaiʻi’s Past, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 631, 652 (2017) (“[M]ost Hawaiʻi citizens recognize
that ‘Hawaiian’ refers to a person of Native Hawaiian ancestry.”).
2. See Galdeira Interview, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, Pub. L. No. 67-34, § 201(a)(7), 42 Stat.
108, 108 (1921) (defining “native Hawaiian” as “any descendent of not less than one-half
part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778”).
9. See Ahuna v. Dep’t of Haw. Home Lands, 640 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Haw. 1982) (“In In
re Ainoa, we recognized the purpose of the HHCA was to rehabilitate the native Hawaiians
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living on the beach dodging a severe rainstorm while hundreds of thousands
of acres of land lay idle with no tenants—struck a nerve.
Galdeira needed to take action. He rallied support from the Waimānalo
community and invited people from across Hawai‘i to learn and discuss the
HHCA and the state agency that administered the Hawaiian Home Lands
program, the state Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (“DHHL”). 10
Those at the gathering complained of the long waiting list for a lease award
and the lack of funding for the agency. 11 They discussed failed award and
leasing policies. 12 They shared serious concerns regarding nepotism and
favoritism within the DHHL. 13 Unbeknownst to them at the time, this
gathering—calling themselves, simply, The Hawaiians—began a political
reawakening of Native Hawaiian consciousness of historical injustices
against Hawai‘i’s Native people. 14 The Hawaiians’ first objective was to
discuss their grievances regarding the Hawaiian Home Lands program with
Hawai‘i’s Governor John A. Burns.15
On October 13, 1970, Galdeira advised Governor Burns that, unless he
agreed to a meeting, The Hawaiians would hold a rally at the State Capitol
during the festivities of Aloha Week, the busiest tourist season, to
“demonstrate that we Hawaiians are united in our drive to get more land
through the [HHCA] and to help encourage our people to participate and
on lands given the status of Hawaiian home lands under section 204 of the HHCA. We
further emphasized there that ‘(the) native Hawaiians are special objects of solicitude under
the Act.’ This language indicates that we are aware of a high duty of care owed to native
Hawaiians.” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)).
10. See Galdeira Interview, supra note 1.
11. Id.; see Pae Galdeira, An Open Letter to the Hawaiian People, HAWAII FREE
PEOPLE’S PRESS, Dec. 1970, at 3, https://ilind.net/oldkine_images/open%20letter%201970.
jpg [https://perma.cc/VMQ5-SQ92] (“We, the people of Hawaii, have journeyed a long and
dark road together. A road which began a long time ago . . . a road which grew smaller,
rougher and painful to us. It was only our spirit and love for our homeland, for our great
mother Hawaii, that lightened the darkness like a flickering candle. There is a great truth in
the old proverb that says, ‘It is better to light one candle than to curse the darkness.’ Let us
stop cursing the darkness of extinction, disunity and poverty. Let us each light a candle of
unity to light our way. Let us each light a candle of love to help our homeland and our
people.”).
12. See Galdeira Interview, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. See Andrade, Hawai‘i ’78, supra note 1, at 106–16.
15. See Galdeira Interview, supra note 1. The Hawaiians also sought to “gain ‘justice’
for the Hawaiians, to improve their social and economic position, and to restore racial
pride.” George S. Kanahele, The New Hawaiians, 29 SOC. PROCESS HAW. 21, 28 (1982),
https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/22974/1/Vol_29.pdf.
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strengthen our cause.”16 Galdeira continued to reach out to the Governor’s
office, yet his calls were met with silence. 17 Galdeira, thus, led a rally at the
State Capitol of Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians from across Hawai‘i to
challenge the Governor’s inaction on the Hawaiian Home Lands program
and to demand a meeting. 18 Governor Burns—clearly embarrassed by the
rally at the heavily media covered event—finally granted The Hawaiians a
meeting, but not before confronting Galdeira.19 Burns yelled to Galdeira,
“What the fock you doing?”20 Galdeira at first showed deference to the
governor, but then shouted back, “Hey, fock you man, because we trying to
reach you and you were giving us this kind of run around.” 21 Burns, clearly
enraged, responded, “Bullshit[.]”22 For about five minutes the governor and
young kanaka from Waimānalo argued. 23 Finally, Burns backed down and
said, “Okay, I want to meet with you at two o’clock.” 24
True to his word, Governor Burns met with Galdeira and the
demonstrators, answered their questions, and assured the group that his
administration would take concrete steps to address the failing Hawaiian
Home Lands program.25 Following the initial Aloha Week confrontation,
the Governor continued to have open discussions with Galdeira and The
Hawaiians about the state of DHHL and the Hawaiian Home Lands
program. These continued discussions led to concrete action, including the
appointment of one of The Hawaiians to lead DHHL. 26 Following the 1970
16. Letter from Raymond Pae Galdeira, Chairman, The Hawaiians, to John A. Burns,
Governor of Hawaii (Oct. 13, 1970) (on file with author) (retrieved from the Hawai‘i State
Archives).
17. See Galdeira Interview, supra note 1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. TOM COFFMAN, TEN YEARS OF COMMUNITY ACTION 18 (1975) (on file with author).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Galdeira Interview, supra note 1; Letter from John A. Burns, Governor of
Hawaii, to Raymond Pae Galdeira, Chairman, The Hawaiians 4 (Oct. 25, 1970) (on file with
author) (retrieved from the Hawai‘i State Archives) (“I would like to see every qualified
applicant off the list and on a homestead. I would like to see the Commission and the
department actively supporting our Hawaiian people in search for solutions to all their
problems, not just housing. I would like to see these programs become a valuable tool in the
revitalization of the Hawaiian culture and an increase of appreciation of what it means to be
Hawaiian by Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians alike.”).
26. See Davianna McGregor-Alegado, Hawaiians: Organizing in the 1970s, 7
AMERASIA J., no. 2, 1980, at 29, 44.
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Aloha Week protest, the small victories of Galdeira and other HHCA
beneficiaries barely scratched the surface of the festering problems that
plagued and continue to haunt the Hawaiian Home Lands program.
The year 2021 marks a century since the passage of the HHCA and over
fifty years since The Hawaiians’ Aloha Week protest against the failures of
the DHHL. The 1921 HHCA was, from its noble inception, an attempt to
rehabilitate a dwindling population of Hawaiians. Yet undergirding the 100year-old law is an origin story colored by racism, rugged American
individualism, and greed. Thus, while the humanitarian endeavor to
rehabilitate Native Hawaiians was laudable, this effort, as discussed in Part
II of this Article, was simply a façade to suppress Native Hawaiian claims
to land and ensure the profitability of a handful of business interests in
Hawai‘i. Indeed, the land provided within the corpus of the HHCA was
unsuitable for agrarian pursuits with little, if any, access to necessary
infrastructure and resources like water; they were lands that, according to
one legislator, “a goat couldn’t live on.”27 In addition, and perhaps more
insidious and damaging, the HHCA codified a divisive racial scheme that
fractured Hawaiians by imposing a new identity based on an arbitrary fifty
percent blood quantum, which ensured that stolen Kingdom lands would
eventually return to the United States. The HHCA reflected the concessions
and negotiations of Hawaiian leaders and the business elite in territorial
Hawai‘i.
The injustices, however, did not end with the creation of the HHCA. For
nearly all of its existence, the United States and the State of Hawai‘i shirked
their responsibilities and obligations under the HHCA to the beneficiaries
of the trust. Part III of this Article specifically analyzes the government’s
failure to address decades-long breaches of trust related to addressing the
inordinately long waiting period to obtain a lease and the abysmal record of
adequately funding DHHL.
Unsurprisingly, this story of injustice is truly a story that captures the
journey of a people forced to demand, decade after decade, what they were
entitled to by law. Pae Galdeira’s interaction with the Burns Administration
fifty years after the HHCA’s passage was an interaction that repeated itself
with each successive administration and generation of Kānaka Maoli. This
injustice continued as the State of Hawai‘i and the federal government
stymied the potential of the Hawaiian Home Lands program and left the
promises of justice unfulfilled.
27. Rehabilitation Should Be Limited to Hawaiians of Pure Blood, Says Governor,
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Apr. 23, 1921, at 1, 7.
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II. Land, Power, and the Guise of Rehabilitation: Analyzing the Origins of
the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act
Perhaps we have a legal right, certainly we have a moral right,
to ask that these lands be set aside. We are not asking that what
you are to do be in the nature of a largesse or as a grant, but as
a matter of justice—belated justice.28
– Jonah Kūhiō Kalaniana‘ole, 1920
In November 1914, at his home in Waikīkī, United States Delegate to
Congress and Hawaiian Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalaniana‘ole hosted a
meeting of 200 Kānaka Maoli interested in forming an organization to
uplift the Hawaiian people, who were reeling from high mortality rates and
the theft of their Kingdom. 29 The group agreed to form Ahahui Pu‘uhonua o
Nā Hawai‘i, the Hawaiian Protective Association (“Ahahui Puuhonua”),
which dedicated its efforts to the rehabilitation of Kānaka Maoli.30 The
organization sought to “build the unity of the Hawaiian people in order to
rebuild the strength of an enlightened Hawaiian race” and pursue objectives
to “help restore stable and pleasant living conditions among the Hawaiian
in the city.”31
Ahahui Pu‘uhonua’s goals were put to the test in 1917, when, because of
American involvement in World War I, Hawai‘i shipping was disrupted.
The prices of staple food items, particularly poi (taro), nearly doubled,
causing economic strain for poor Hawaiians now living in tenements. 32
Reports highlighted that Hawaiians in these tenements lacked food and
were inundated with diseases. 33 Leaders of Ahahui Pu‘uhonua, including
Kūhiō and many middle and upper class Hawaiians organized an initiative
that eventually led to the creation of the Hawaiian Civic Clubs. 34 Their first
order of business was to gain federal support of a Hawaiian homesteading
28. 66 CONG. REC. 7453 (1920) (statement of Delegate Kalaniana‘ole).
29. Davianna Pōmaika‘i McGregor, ‘Āina Hoopulapula: Hawaiian Homesteading, 24
HAWAIIAN J. HIST. 1, 1 (1990) [hereinafter McGregor, Hawaiian Homesteading], https://
evols.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10524/590/2/JL24007.pdf.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 4; Frank Bailey, Jr., ‘Āina Ho‘opulapula: A Contested Legacy: Prince Jonah
Kūhiō Kalanaiana'ole's Hawaiian Homes Commission Act During the Territorial Years,
1921-1959, at 69–70 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai‘i, 2009) (on file
with the University of Hawai‘i Hamilton Library, University of Hawai‘i—Mānoa)
(describing the conditions in tenement housing).
34. See McGregor, Hawaiian Homesteading, supra note 29, at 4.
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program to provide the tenement residents with a new start.35 A legislative
committee of Ahahui Pu‘uhonua submitted a draft rehabilitation resolution
to territorial legislator John H. Wise in December 1918.36
Wise, who was imprisoned with Prince Kūhiō in 1895 for participating
in a revolt against the self-proclaimed Republic of Hawai‘i following the
illegal overthrow of the Kingdom, 37 became instrumental in the effort to
return lands to the Hawaiian people through the enactment of a
homesteading program. 38 Kūhiō and Wise joined forces to navigate politics
in Hawai‘i and Washington D.C. to advocate for passage of the HHCA.
Given this advocacy, in 1920, Congress held hearings about the
condition of Hawai‘i’s indigenous peoples. 39 Hawaiians were a “dying
race” with the number of “full-blooded Hawaiians” dropping from 142,650
in 1826 to 22,500 in 1919.40 In a statement to a congressional committee,
territorial Senator Wise described what it meant to be Hawaiian and
emphasized the importance of the people’s connection to the ‘āina (land):
The Hawaiian people are a farming people and fishermen, outof-door people, and when they were frozen out of their lands and
driven into the cities they had to live in the cheapest places,
tenements. That is one of the reasons why the Hawaiian people
are dying. Now, the only way to save them, I contend, is to take
them back to the lands and give them the mode of living that
their ancestors were accustomed to and in that way rehabilitate
them. 41

35. Id. at 5–6.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Troy J.H. Andrade, American Overthrow, HAW. B.J., Apr. 2018, at 4, 13
[hereinafter Andrade, American Overthrow].
38. JON M. VAN DYKE, WHO OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAWAI‘I? 242 (2008).
39. Proposed Amendments to the Organic Act of the Territory of Hawaii: Hearing on
the Rehabilitation and Colonization of Hawaiians and Other Proposed Amendments to the
Organic Act of the Territory of Hawaii and on the Proposed Transfer of the Buildings of the
Federal Leprosy Investigation Station at Kalawao on the Island of Molokai, to the Territory
of Hawaii Before the H. Comm. On the Territories, 66th Cong. 32, 47 (1920) [hereinafter
February House Hearings], https://books.google.com/books?id=KEAvAAAAMAAJ&pg
=PA1&lpg=PA1&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false (statement of John H. Wise, Territorial
Senator).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 66-839, at 2 (1920).
41. Id. at 4.
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Because of the rapid population decline, Kānaka Maoli were “fast
becoming a minority element among the races of the Islands, with the
probable result that in the future political control will pass into other
hands.”42 Senator Wise sought to provide land to all Hawaiians as a means
to ensure their connection to the ‘āina and their continued existence in their
homelands.
Wise’s plan, however, was met with considerable opposition from and
undermined by powerful business interests, particularly in the sugar and
ranching industries. These business elite, often called the Big Five, wielded
nearly unmatched economic and political influence in territorial Hawai‘i
and in Washington, D.C.43 They exerted their power against Wise’s and
Kūhiō’s rehabilitation measure. Indeed, the rehabilitation measure, while on
its face an effort to redress historical injustices, became a means to
perpetuate the subjugation of ancestral lands and rights through the seizure
of Crown and Government Lands and the “gifting” of lands back to the
indigenous people. With this law, Congress further undermined the
prospect of rehabilitation by racializing Hawaiians and premising a lease
award of homestead land on the satisfaction of a new “native Hawaiian”
identity. These inherent flaws of the HHCA have, as explained below,
furthered American colonization by clouding claims to land and poisoning
Kānaka views of self and self-governance.
A. Justifying the Seizure of Crown and Government Lands
The decades-long conflict over land between Kānaka Maoli and the
powerful sugar interests reared its head with passage of the HHCA. 44 While
those like Wise and Kūhiō saw the value in rehabilitating the Hawaiian
people—as it was a measure advocated for since passage of the Land Act in
1895—others saw the effort to place Hawaiians back on land through

42. Id. at 2.
43. The Big Five were five corporations (Castle & Cooke, Alexander & Baldwin, C.
Brewer & Co., American Factors, and Theo H. Davies & Co.) that exerted considerable
political and economic power in territorial Hawai‘i. Eric K. Yamamoto & George K.
Yamamoto, Ethnicity and the Hawaii Bar: Looking Back, Looking Forward, HAW. B.J., Oct.
1999, at 111, 111, 3-OCT HIBJ 111 (Westlaw).
44. For example, the Kingdom of Hawai‘i granted long term leases for 26,653 acres of
Crown lands that were the best agricultural land to sugar interests that were set to expire
between 1917 and 1921. See Marylyn M. Vause, The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act,
1920: History and Analysis 17 (1962) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Hawai‘i—
Mānoa) (on file with the University of Hawai‘i Law Library, University of Hawai‘i—
Mānoa).
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homesteading as an opportunity to convince Congress to release restrictions
on the sugar industry that were put in place by the Organic Act of 1900.
The Organic Act, which created the Territory of Hawai‘i, limited
agricultural leases of public land to five years and precluded businesses,
like sugar planters and ranchers, from acquiring and holding more than one
thousand acres of land. 45 In 1908, Congress amended the Organic Act and
extended the leasing of public land from five years to fifteen years.46 The
1908 amendment also permitted the government to withdraw agricultural
leases for homesteading or other public purposes. 47 Fears about sugar and
ranching interests peaked when Congress amended the Organic Act in 1910
to allow any twenty-five persons to obtain title to agricultural homesteads
upon petitioning the territorial government. 48 The 1908 and 1910
amendments provided an opportunity for individuals to potentially access
prime agricultural lands for homesteading. At stake with passage of any
homesteading legislation, particularly one that addressed the health
conditions of Kānaka Maoli, was the economic superiority of Hawai‘i’s
business elite—the vast majority of whom participated in or were
beneficiaries of the 1893 illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. 49
In February 1920, the territorial legislature sent a delegation handpicked
by territorial Governor Charles J. McCarthy to Washington, D.C., to lobby
the United States House Committee on Territories for approval of two
proposals that would amend the existing homesteading laws and implement
Wise’s plan with a new law concerning the rehabilitation of Hawaiians. 50
With the exception of the delegation’s leader, Senator Wise, the remaining
members of this Hawaiian Legislative Commission were aligned with the
business elite in Hawai‘i.51 The first proposal, territorial Senate Concurrent
Resolution 2, which was authored by Senator Wise, requested a
homesteading program of rehabilitation for Hawaiians:

45. Hawaii Organic Act, ch. 339, §§ 55, 73, 31 Stat. 141, 150, 155 (1900).
46. An Act to Amend Section Seventy-Three of the Act to Provide a Government for
the Territory of Hawaii, ch. 124, § 1, 35 Stat. 56, 56 (1908).
47. Id.
48. Act of May 27, 1910, ch. 258, § 5, 36 Stat. 443, 446.
49. See Andrade, American Overthrow, supra note 37.
50. J. KĒHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD: COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY 99–100 (2008).
51. See McGregor, Hawaiian Homesteading, supra note 29, at 18.
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that the Congress of the United States of America be respectfully
petitioned herein to make such amendments to the [Organic Act]
or by other provisions deemed proper in the premises, that from
time to time there may be set aside suitable portions of the public
lands of the Territory of Hawaii by allotments to or for
associations, settlements, or individuals of Hawaiian blood in
whole or in part, the fee simple title of such lands to remain in
the government, but the use thereof to be available under such
restrictions as to improvements, size of lots, occupation and
otherwise as may be provided for said purposes by a commission
duly authorized or otherwise giving preference rights in such
homestead leases for the purposes hereof as may be deemed just
and suitable by the Congress assembled . . . .52
The second proposal, territorial House Concurrent Resolution 28, which
had the full support of the remaining delegation, was conditioned on
“adequate provisions” being made to “accomplish the purpose” of Senate
Concurrent Resolution 2.53 Under House Concurrent Resolution 28, the
territorial legislature, at the insistence of the sugar and ranching industries,
requested that Congress amend the Organic Act to allow one-fifth of
“highly cultivated public lands” to be exempt from general homesteading
laws and be allowed to be sold to the highest bidder—resulting in more
public lands being leased at low rates to the large businesses. 54
At the U.S. House Committee on Territories hearing, Wise pled that land
be returned to Kānaka Maoli as Hawaiian commoners received very little
land in the 1848 Māhele, 55 while the government took 1,505,460 acres and
the crown received 984,000 acres.56 With the assistance of Kūhiō, Wise
sought to convince the House Committee that passage of the rehabilitation
measure would ensure justice for Hawaiians: “The Hawaiian people, those
52. S. Con. Res. 2, 10th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Terr. of Haw. 1919), reprinted in S. JOURNAL,
10th Leg., Reg. Sess. 25–26 (Terr. of Haw. 1919), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.
31951002253161e&view=1up&seq=48&skin=2021.
53. H.R. Con. Res. 28, 10th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Terr. of Haw. 1919), reprinted in H.R.
JOURNAL, 10th Leg., Reg. Sess. 300–06 (Terr. of Haw. 1919).
54. Id.
55. See McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1336 n.5 (Haw. 1973)
(“The term mahele means to divide or apportion. When used in the context of land titles,
reference is usually to the Great Mahele of 1848, which accomplished the division of the
undivided interest in land between the King on one hand and the chief and konohikis on the
other.”) (internal citations omitted)).
56. February House Hearings, supra note 39, at 28.
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of Hawaiian blood, have rights to these crown lands, for the Government of
the United States and the Territory of Hawaii have given them these rights.
We feel that we have not got all that is coming to us.” 57 Kūhiō believed the
common people “assumed that these lands were being held in trust by the
crown for their benefit” and that the Republic of Hawai‘i’s merging of these
Crown lands with the Government lands was another example of “the
injustice done the common people by those in power.”58 Kūhiō added:
“Perhaps we have a legal right, certainly we have a moral right, to ask that
these lands be set aside. We are not asking that what you are to do be in the
nature of a largesse or as a grant, but as a matter of justice—belated
justice.”59 Thus, the Hawaiian politicians viewed the rehabilitation program
as a means to effectuate the result of the Māhele in which Hawaiians had a
continuing claim in the land. 60
At the request of the House Committee on Territories Chair Charles F.
Curry, the two territorial proposals were revised and resubmitted as one
piece of legislation, House Resolution 12683.61 Territorial Attorney General
Harry S. Irwin drafted the new legislation for Kūhiō to introduce. 62 House
Resolution 12683 proposed “sweeping changes” to the Organic Act. 63
Among the heavily criticized changes was an amendment that would have
allowed the leasing through public auction of all “highly cultivated public
lands,” as opposed to only one-fifth as suggested in House Concurrent
Resolution 28.64 Attorney General Irwin designed what would be called the
“Kuhio Bill” to ensure that the public auction process would guarantee that
the sugar planters would win all bids for public lands. 65
57. Id. at 32.
58. Prince J.K. Kalanianaole, The Story of the Hawaiians, 21 MID-PAC. MAG. 117, 126,
129 (1921), https://books.google.com/books?id=jcFBAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA101&lpg=PA
101&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false.
59. 66 CONG. REC. 7453 (1920) (statement of Delegate Kalaniana‘ole).
60. See VAN DYKE, supra note 38, at 253 (“For purposes of this study, the most
important perception that emerged from the debates creating the Hawaiian Home Lands
Program was the understanding that the Crown Lands were lands that the Hawaiian
Monarchs held in trust for all the Native Hawaiian People, and that the common Hawaiians
had a continuing claim to these lands because they received such a minimal amount of land
during and after the 1848 Mahele. . . . Native Hawaiians have a continuing claim to these
lands.”).
61. H.R. Res. 12683, 66th Cong. (1920).
62. See Vause, supra note 44, at 54.
63. Paul Nahoa Lucas et al., Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN
LAW: A TREATISE 176, 185 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 2015).
64. H.R. Res. 12683, 66th Cong.
65. See Vause, supra note 44, at 55–56.
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A “firestorm of protest” erupted when news of the proposal reached the
Hawaiian Islands: “Some citizens alleged that the legislative commission
had violated the will of the territorial legislature and had succumbed to a
sugar planters’ conspiracy ‘to prevent homesteading’ of the cultivated sugar
lands.”66 One citizen vehemently opposed the Kuhio Bill: “The proposed
statute plays directly into the hands of the powerful corporations doing
business here—in many cases founded by those who came to Hawaii
bearing the banner of the cross upon their shoulders and the message of
‘peace on earth, good will toward men’ in their hearts . . . .”67 Governor
McCarthy, a member of the Hawaiian Legislative Commission, brushed off
the proposal as a simple misunderstanding that he thought had the support
of the people of Hawai‘i.68
The Kuhio Bill was subsequently resubmitted as House Resolution
13500, which (un)surprisingly and despite the backlash in Hawai‘i afforded
additional benefits to the sugar interests in Hawai‘i. 69 For example, the
resolution exempted “all cultivated sugar-cane lands” from the inventory of
“available lands” that would be set aside for Hawaiian homesteading. 70 At
the same time, the resolution designated the most marginal and remote
lands for Native Hawaiian homesteading.71 The proposed law also included,
for the first time and as discussed further below, a blood quantum
requirement of one thirty-second part or more Hawaiian blood to be eligible
to obtain a lease—the length of which was also dramatically reduced from
999 to 99 years.72
Several rounds of congressional hearings were held on the new bill.73 A
vocal dissent made clear their belief that the law was unconstitutional and,
if passed, needed to be significantly curtailed to ensure that homesteads
would only be available to full blooded Hawaiians. 74 Others opposed the
66. Id. at 56–84.
67. Dudley Burrows, Raymond Ready to Spend Last Cent in Fight on Land Bill, PAC.
COM. ADVERTISER (Honolulu), Mar. 28, 1920, § 2, at 1, 5.
68. Commission Preparing Official Statement in Answer to Criticisms, PAC. COM.
ADVERTISER (Honolulu), Mar. 31, 1920, at 1.
69. H.R. Res. 13500, 66th Cong. (1920).
70. Id. § 203.
71. Id.
72. Id. §§ 201(a)(7), 208(2).
73. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920: Hearings on H.R. 13500 Before the S.
Comm. on the Territories, 66th Cong. 91 (1920) [hereinafter December Senate Hearings],
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/HHCA-House-Hearing-Dec-14-1920-forHR-13500.pdf.
74. Id.
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measure as it still provided Kānaka Maoli with marginal lands. 75 Territorial
Representative William Jarrett stated: “They want to give the Hawaiians
land that a goat couldn’t live on. This whole thing is a joke. The real
purpose of this bill is to cut out homesteading. If you want to cut out
homesteading, then pass the bill.”76
The proponents urged passage of the bill on several grounds. One of the
bases for passage of the bill was that the effort toward native rehabilitation
would serve as an “anti-Asian remedy” given the influx of foreign labor in
Hawai‘i.77 Advocates for passage of the bill sought to highlight the need to
rehabilitate and reconcile with Hawaiians for their historical displacement
from the land.78 As to the issue of reconciliation, Kūhiō recognized:
It is a fact, though, that the constitution granted by Kamehameha
III recognized that the common people had the same interest in
the lands of the kingdom as the king and the chiefs. In 1845 it
was not only again recognized, but recognized to the extent of
owning a third interest in these lands. 79
Kūhiō again explained the importance of the people’s interest in the land:
What we contend is that in the first constitution given by
Kamehameha III, the rights of the common people in the lands
of the Kingdom were recognized and that later—in 1845—it was
again recognized not only as an ownership but a third interest in
the lands of the Kingdom. In the division, we claim that the
common people did not get their share, and Mr. Wise stated that
at that time the Hawaiians believed that the lands which were
turned over to the crown were held by the monarch for the
benefit of the common people. 80

75. Id.
76. Rehabilitation Should Be Limited to Hawaiians of Pure Blood, Says Governor,
supra note 27, at 7.
77. See KAUANUI, supra note 50, at 107.
78. See December Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 54, 91, 94.
79. Id. at 91.
80. Id. at 94.
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Reverend Akaiko Akana, a pastor of Kawaiaha‘o Church in Honolulu,
testified on behalf of Ahuhui Pu‘uhonua and argued: “The bill before us
does not ask others to help us. The land involved is our own, by moral
equity, and the money with which to finance the project comes from the
rental of this land.”81
In its report, which was sympathetic to the Kānaka politicians’ view, the
U.S. House Committee on Territories concluded that
(1) the Hawaiian must be placed upon the land in order to insure
[sic] his rehabilitation; (2) alienation of such land must, not only
in the immediate future but also for many years to come, be
made impossible; (3) accessible water in adequate amounts must
be provided for all tracts; and (4) the Hawaiian must be
financially aided until his farming operations are well under
way. 82
Chair Curry noted the significance of the Māhele and the importance of the
history of the Crown lands: “There is an equity and justice in saying that
these crown lands belonged to the Hawaiian people.”83 The Committee
Report acknowledged the continuing claim Native Hawaiians had to the
land:
But having been recognized as owners of a third interest in the
lands of the kingdom, the common people, believing that in the
future means were to be adopted to place them in full possession
of these lands, assumed that the residue was being held in trust
by the Crown for their benefit. However, the lands were never
conveyed to the common people and, after a successful
revolution, were arbitrarily seized, and by an article in the
Hawaiian constitution became the public lands of the Republic
of Hawaii.84
But the proposal failed to pass in the U.S. Senate given the business on the
congressional calendar at the time. 85
81. Id. at 54.
82. H.R. REP. NO. 66-839, at 7.
83. See February House Hearings, supra note 39, at 32.
84. H.R. REP. NO. 66-839, at 5.
85. See KAUANUI, supra note 50, at 150 (“Though the Bill itself died with the passing of
the last Congress on March 4, I am able to state to you that many of its provisions met no
opposition and that the much discussed sections opening the way for the Hawaiians to return
to the land were looked upon favorably by the members of both Houses of Congress. . . .
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At home in Hawai‘i, Delegate Kūhiō faced a community still angered at
the prospect of providing Hawaiians with the worst agricultural land while
ensuring prime agricultural lands for the plantations. Kūhiō, believing that
Congress would never support the homesteading of prime agricultural land,
defended his selection of homesteading land as good for diversified
agriculture and enterprise and to encourage Kānaka Maoli to work hard on
the land:
“Much has been said that the Hawaiians are not getting the
best lands,” [Kūhiō] continued. “I have told the committee that
they don’t want the sugar lands, but the lands on which they can
diversify the industries. This bill provides for means to education
the people, to tell you what best to plant on certain lands, and
where cattle and hogs can be best raised and so on.”
....
“I want to tell you that Congress does not believe and never
will believe as a policy in homesteading land worth from $500 to
$1000 an acre. That is not the American way. What made the
American people great was the work of its pioneers in
developing that which was worth nothing.
....
“Too many Hawaiians have said in effect: ‘Give us the best
land you’ve got, give us all the money you can, feed us on poi
and fish, and we’ll be happy.’ I want to tell you that you never
will succeed unless you get out and hustle.” 86
In a later speech, Kūhiō acknowledged the sugar interests’ political power
being wielded in Washington, D.C., and explained the rationale of the bill:
“This rehabilitation bill is the first opportunity given the poor
man to go on the land with funds to help him make a living. . . .
“They say that the lands to be set aside under this bill are no
good. If I were to attempt in Congress to take away cane lands
for the Hawaiian people there would be a terrible row; one
would never hear the last about.
Yes, the Bill is dead; but it failed at the last movement in the Senate owing to the
congestions of business at the short session of Congress.”) (quoting Delegate Kalaniana‘ole).
86. Delegate Kuhio Tells Hawaiians They Must Get Out and Hustle, PAC. COM.
ADVERTISER (Honolulu), June 26, 1920, at 6.
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“They say the bill will kill homesteading. Nothing of the kind.
The money from the first-class agricultural lands will go to
supporting the Hawaiians on the other lands. . . .
....
“This will save the Hawaiian people from being a dead
race . . . .”87
According to Kūhiō, Congress believed that withholding homesteading on
prime agricultural lands and allowing them to continue to be leased by
sugar interests benefitted the homesteading program because a part of the
income derived from sugar leases would be used to support the
rehabilitation program.88
The bill nevertheless went back to the territorial legislature and was
further amended by Senator Wise, who sought to compromise with the
business interests that were opposing the measure. The result of these
negotiations was territorial Senate Concurrent Resolution 8, which
amended the language of House Resolution 13500 to: (1) require a fiveyear trial program before permanent implementation; (2) repeal the 1,000acre limit on corporate ownership in public lands available for leasing; and
(3) require beneficiaries to have one-half Hawaiian blood.89 The change in
the blood quantum requirement, as discussed below, caused concern for
many Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian legislators.90 Regardless, the territorial
legislature approved the changes and a final push was made in Washington,
D.C. to pass the revised proposal.
The result of this effort was the 1921 enactment of the HHCA, which
authorized the United States to lease certain lands, the former Government
and Crown lands of the Hawaiian Kingdom, as homestead plots, to native
Hawaiians for a nominal fee. 91 Wise and Kūhiō achieved their goal of
87. Kakaako Hears Kalanianaole on Hawaiian Rehabilitation, PAC. COM. ADVERTISER
(Honolulu), Sept. 24, 1920, § 2, at 1, 2.
88. PRINCE JONAH KŪHIŌ KALANIANA‘ OLE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF HAWAII 4–5
(1921) [hereinafter KŪHIŌ REPORT ] (available at the Hawai‘i State Archives); Letter from
Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalaniana‘ole to Governor Charles J. McCarthy 2 (Mar. 7, 1921)
(available at the Hawai‘i State Archives).
89. S. Con. Res. 8, 11th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Terr. of Haw. 1921), reprinted in S. JOURNAL,
11th Leg., Reg. Sess. 670 (Terr. of Haw. 1921), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=
umn.31951002253163a&view=1up&seq=686&skin=2021.
90. See KAUANUI, supra note 50, at 152–57.
91. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, Pub. L. No. 67-34, §§ 207-208, 42 Stat.
108, 110–11 (1921).
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putting Hawaiians (at least some) back on the land. The HHCA, thus,
required the United States to set aside approximately 203,500 acres to
provide homestead leases of land for residential and agricultural purposes
for native Hawaiians, defined as “any descendent of not less than one-half
part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to
1778.”92
The sugar interests had their say and successfully marshalled language
that excluded prime sugarcane lands from being placed in the hands of
native Hawaiians. The HHCA specifically defined “available lands” as:
“All public lands of the description and acreage as follows, excluding (a) all
lands within any forest reservation; (b) all cultivated sugar-cane lands, and
(c) all public lands held under certificate of occupation, homestead lease,
right of purchase lease, or special homestead agreement.” 93 Thus, by
excluding “all cultivated sugarcane lands” from the definition of “available
lands” for use in the homesteading scheme, Congress capitulated to the
capitalist pressure of the wealthy sugar interests in Hawai‘i and undercut
the purpose of returning Native Hawaiians to a more agrarian lifestyle. 94
Instead, native Hawaiians were left with lands “in remote locations far from
urbanized areas, on the dry, leeward side of each island, generally with poor
soils and rough terrain[.]”95The “available lands” were lands that lacked
water for irrigation or domestic use. Over a quarter of the lands set aside
under the HHCA were barren lava fields with another 7,800 acres
consisting of the slopes of steep mountains. 96

92. Id. § 201, 42 Stat. at 108.
93. Id. § 203, 42 Stat. at 109.
94. See VAN DYKE, supra note 38, at 246 (“The [HHCA] preserved ‘only a very small
part . . . of the domain’ the Hawaiians were entitled to because of the pressure from the
Western sugar interests in the Islands. Because the Western elites wanted to keep the best
lands available for lease by their sugar plantations, the lands eventually chosen for the
homestead program had only marginal agricultural potential.”).
95. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, REPORT ON THE HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS PROGRAM :
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FEDERAL-STATE
TASK FORCE III-4 (Jan. 1992).
96. Davianna Pomaika‘i McGregor, Kupa‘a I Ka ‘Āina: Persistence on the Land 297
(1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai‘i) (on file with the University
of Hawai‘i Hamilton Library, University of Hawai‘i—Mānoa) (“Almost all of the lands
lacked water for irrigation or domestic use. Most of the lands were rough, rocky and dry,
55,000 acres were covered with barren lava. Another 7,800 acres were the steep parts of
mountains.”); see also Trust Land Maps, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR: OFF. OF NATIVE HAWAIIAN
RELATIONS, https://www.doi.gov/hawaiian/home-land-maps (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
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Importantly, the HHCA provided an opportunity for the United States to
give some Kānaka Maoli an interest in land that they were denied during
the Māhele and thereby “reconcile” for the subsequent theft of Crown and
Government lands of the Kingdom. Under the guise of rehabilitation, in
providing these leases, the United States arguably clouded the legal rights
that Kānaka had in the land following the Māhele to one of a moral gift
from a benevolent (and “legitimate”) government to rehabilitate the dying
Hawaiian population. The passage of the HHCA, therefore, represented
another opportunity for the United States to claim legal rights and title to
stolen Kingdom lands. The clear victors in passage of the legislation was
Hawai‘i’s sugar and ranching elite and the United States who solidified and
legitimized the seizure of Hawaiian lands. Is this what Kūhiō envisioned as
justice?
B. Racialization and the Division of Hawaiians
The part-Hawaiian . . . are a virile, prolific, and enterprising lot
of people. They have large families and they raise them—they
bring them up. These part Hawaiians have had the advantage,
since annexation especially, of the American viewpoint and the
advantage of a pretty good public school system, and they are an
educated people. They are not in the same class with the pure
bloods . . . .97
– Attorney A.G.M. Robertson, 1920
Simply obtaining the best land at the expense of the indigenous
population was not enough. The HHCA also provided an opportunity for
the ugliness of America’s poisonous obsession with race to penetrate
Hawai‘i and divide Hawaiians. The issue of who would benefit from the
Hawaiian homesteading program, as briefly discussed above, was ever
present during the debates and negotiations leading to passage of the
HHCA. The Hawaiian politicians, based on discussions in the Ahahui
Pu‘uhonua, believed that all Hawaiians as the indigenous population were
entitled to participation in the homesteading program given the history of
land dispossession and the interest held by Kānaka in land following the
Māhele. By 1921, the Hawaiian politicians—in response to the business
elite’s strident opposition—conceded to the idea of limiting the beneficiary
class.98 The debates and private conversations surrounding passage of the
97. December Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 15.
98. See McGregor, Hawaiian Homesteading, supra note 29, at 27; Vause, supra note
44, at 85–87. In order to achieve passage of the bill, the proposed HHCA was also portrayed
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bill highlight the way in which Hawai‘i’s sugar and ranching interests
forced this shift from defining Hawaiian identity by indigeneity to a
definition based on race. These interests first weaponized race in an attempt
to stop passage of the HHCA by claiming reverse racism against the white
American population in Hawai‘i.99 Second, Hawai‘i’s business elite argued
that there were distinctions among Hawaiians that justified narrowing the
class of beneficiaries by imposing higher blood quantum requirements. 100
The initial proposal for the Hawaiian rehabilitation bill sent from
territorial Senator John H. Wise provided “that from time to time there may
be set aside suitable portions of the public lands of the Territory of Hawaii
by allotments to or for associations, settlements, or individuals of Hawaiian
blood in whole or in part . . . .”101 Although the proposal sought to make
lands available to all Hawaiians, Representative Cassius C. Dowell of Iowa,
as a member of the U.S. House Committee on Territories, questioned Wise
about the beneficiaries of this program:
Mr. DOWELL. One other matter. I notice in the resolution that
you provide for those of Hawaiian blood.
Mr. WISE. Yes.
Mr. DOWELL. How far do you go with that?
Mr. WISE. Anybody with Hawaiian blood.
Mr. DOWELL. How much do you consider to be within the
resolution; what is your plan?
Mr. WISE. I content that anybody, even to the thirty-second
degree should be included.

as an Anti-Asian law that would prevent individuals of Asian descent from acquiring lands
in the United States and from being more successful than Hawaiians. See KAUANUI, supra
note 50, at 107–08 (noting that congressional leaders and judges had unfavorable and racist
views of Asians).
99. See, e.g., December Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 14 (transcribing arguments
of an attorney representing the business elite in Hawai‘i).
100. See id. at 15.
101. S. Con. Res. 2, 10th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Terr. of Haw. 1919), reprinted in S. JOURNAL,
10th Leg., Reg. Sess. 25–26 (Terr. of Haw. 1919), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.
31951002253161e&view=1up&seq=48&skin=2021.
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Mr. DOWELL. And the thirty-second degree—
Mr. WISE. If he had Hawaiian blood in him.
Mr. DOWELL. Would he be entitled to homestead the same as
a full-blood Hawaiian?
Mr. WISE. Yes, sir.102
Committee Chairman Curry apparently extrapolated a blood requirement
from this colloquy: “This land is to be homesteaded for the preservation of
the Hawaiian race, for the Hawaiian people, the Hawaiian blood pure and to
the 32d degree.”103 The committee thus amended the bill to include a
definition of native Hawaiian as a person of at least one thirty-second
Hawaiian blood.104 While the U.S. House sympathized with the need for
providing the rehabilitation program to more Hawaiians, witnesses before
the U.S. Senate questioned the validity of the entire program.
At a December 14, 1920 hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Territories on House Resolution 13500, Alexander George Morison
Robertson, retired territorial Supreme Court Chief Justice and now-attorney
for Parker Ranch, claimed that the bill separated “whites from Hawaiians
and Part-Hawaiians, taxing one for the benefit of the other, discriminating
against the one and favoring the other according to the color of his skin and
the kind of blood that God has but in his veins.” 105 Robertson was a former
staffer of overthrow plotter and Republic President Sanford B. Dole and a
judge advocate at the trials of the Hawaiian military commission, which
tried Wise and Kūhiō following the 1895 rebellion. 106 He was joined in
Washington, D.C. by a new crop of territory representatives, including
George M. McClellan, the head of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce;
102. See February House Hearings, supra note 39, at 45.
103. Id. at 79.
104. H.R. Res. 13500, 66th Cong. (1920); see VAN DYKE, supra note 38, at 247 n.56 (“A
1/32 blood requirement would include everyone with a Hawaiian ancestry within the past
five generations, and Senator Wise may have thought that it would essentially include
everyone with some Hawaiian blood.”).
105. See December Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 14.
106. 1 MEN OF HAWAII : BEING A BIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCE LIBRARY, COMPLETE AND
AUTHENTIC, OF THE MEN OF NOTE AND SUBSTANTIAL ACHIEVEMENT IN THE HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS 225 (John William Siddall ed., 1917) [hereinafter MEN OF HAWAII] (noting that
Robertson was on Sanford B. Dole’s staff and was a Judge Advocate for the Hawaiian
Military Commission for the trial of prisoners in 1895). Sanford B. Dole was an Associate
Justice of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i’s Supreme Court before helping to lead the overthrow of
the Kingdom. See Andrade, American Overthrow, supra note 37, at 8–9.
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W.B. Pittman, a representative of Raymond Ranch and brother of Nevada
Senator Key Pittman; B.G. Rivenbaugh, a former public lands
commissioner; and Reverend Akaiko Akana.107
For attorney Robertson, who “absolutely opposed” the bill, “[t]here are
hundreds of white men out there who feel they are absolutely against this
bill and that they are being discriminated against by it who can not send
representatives to Washington.” 108 In a discussion regarding the
appropriation of territorial funds for bringing water to trust lands,
Robertson again voiced his strident opposition: “These moneys, mind you,
come out of the pockets of the white taxpayers of the Territory and are
handed over to or are used for the benefit of the Hawaiian population—as
we find it stated in the bill here—of one thirty-second Polynesian blood.”109
Kūhiō attempted to rebut Robertson’s argument by arguing that the bill was
designed to be paid for by a share of the revenue from sugar and water
leases.110 Robertson never conceded. In his opposition, perhaps the first in
what would be become a consistent attack on Hawaiian programs for
generations, Robertson cleverly sidestepped the reality that white
Americans and Hawaiians were not similarly situated in Hawai‘i because of
the history of and destruction from colonization, and instead argued that the
white population in Hawai‘i was being discriminated against. 111
Commissioner McClellan, the head of the Honolulu Chamber of
Commerce, furthered Robertson’s reverse racism argument:

107. December Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 5.
108. Id. at 12.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Id. at 73–74, 129 (“[F]rom the statement [Robertson] has been making he is trying
to lead you to believe that he is representing the white people. In Hawaii we do not know of
such a thing as the white people. All we know is, we are all Americans. My belief is that the
majority of the so-called white people are back of this bill. . . . Judge Robertson objects to
the bill for reasons that are not well founded. He strains the point that the money to be raised
for the purpose of carrying out this bill will be by taxation . . . and that the Americans or
whites, as he calls them, would be subject to increased taxation for the benefits of the
Hawaiian, discriminating against the whites for the benefit of the Hawaiian. This statement
is absolutely untrue. . . . Section 213 of this bill provides for the creation of a revolving fund
to be derived from 30 per cent of the Territorial receipts derived from the leasing of the
cultivated sugar-cane lands and water licenses.”).
111. Id. at 10.
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There are grave reasons why Congress should provide for the
rehabilitation of the Caucasian race in Hawaii. The country is
deeply interested in the maintaining of a real American
community in the Hawaiian Islands. They are interested in that
because the maintenance of an American population is
absolutely essential to the holding of Hawaii as a strategic
military and naval base. Without a population which is
reasonably American, it will be impossible to maintain Hawaii
as a real American outpost.112
For McClellan, empowering Kānaka through the homesteading program
ensured Hawaiian stability and progress, which thereby posed a direct
threat to American imperialist interests in the islands. McClellan then made
clear that white American superiority was his paramount concern: “It may
be summed up by saying that this is the first time in all the history of the
United States that any legislation ever came before Congress and was
seriously considered which gave rights to a dark race above and against the
rights of the white race.”113 By invoking a violation of the civil rights of
white Americans in Hawai‘i, the business elite successfully shifted the
debate in Congress from one of Hawaiians being entitled to land to one of
blood. The question remained: how much blood was enough?
While arguing that the legislation would discriminate against white
Americans in Hawai‘i, Robertson simultaneously suggested that there was a
clear distinction between a pure blooded Hawaiian and a part-Hawaiian. 114
He described the demographic shift in population, with the number of pure
Hawaiians dropping and the population of part-Hawaiian increasing. 115
According to Robertson, the part-Hawaiian was far more competent than
the pure Hawaiian and therefore undeserving of assistance:
[T]he part-Hawaiian . . . are a virile, prolific, and enterprising lot
of people. They have large families and they raise them—they
bring them up. These part Hawaiians have had the advantage,
since annexation especially, of the American viewpoint and the
advantage of a pretty good public school system, and they are an

112. Id. at 88.
113. Id. at 112.
114. Id. at 15 (“The part-Hawaiian race must be differentiated from the Hawaiians of the
pure blood . . . .”).
115. Id.
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educated people. They are not in the same class with the pure
bloods . . . .116
Instead, the part-Hawaiians “are able to stand on their own feet.”117 In a
stunning move and, again, in an attempt to shift the narrative away from
Kānaka entitlement to land, Robertson then targeted fellow witness
Reverend Akaiko Akana: “Here is the Rev. Akaiko Akana—part Hawaiian
and part Chinese, why should I be taxed for his rehabilitation? Yet the bill
proposes that.”118 As scholar Kēhaulani Kauanui described: “Robertson’s
rhetorical question as to why he should be taxed for Akana’s rehabilitation
worked to register a dismissal for all part-Hawaiians.”119
Nevertheless, Robertson continued to assert that the predicament of the
Hawaiian could not be solved with legislation, but was more appropriately
solved by the American notion of picking oneself up by their bootstraps.
Robertson argued: “I think that the remedy is psychological rather than
legislative. But, be that as it may, the part Hawaiian people, as I say, are
virile, prolific, increasing, enterprising, intelligent people, and cannot be
said to need any rehabilitation . . . .”120 W.B. Pittman, who was also sent as
part of the territory’s delegation to the hearing, agreed:
A few Hawaiians of pure blood who might be entitled to
governmental assistance would not in any manner be benefited
by the passage of the present bill, because all of the lands would
be taken up by the part-Hawaiians who do not need any
rehabilitating and are amply able to take care of themselves, as
they are intelligent, industrious and prolific. 121
Echoing the sentiment in Hawai‘i, Governor McCarthy addressed the
territorial House and stated: “If the native Hawaiian would get out and
work, and make a good living for himself and his family by the sweat of his
brow, the race would flourish. That is what the rehabilitation project aims
at—not sitting on the fence and playing the ukulele.” 122

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See KAUANUI, supra note 50, at 128.
120. See December Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 15.
121. Letter from W.B. Pittman to Senator Reed Smoot 2 (Jan. 10, 1921) (available at the
Hawai‘i State Archives).
122. Rehabilitation Should Be Limited to Hawaiians of Pure Blood, Says Governor,
supra note 27, at 7.
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The racist views of the white business elite from the territory
successfully set the stage for the U.S. Senate to debate the imposition a
blood quantum requirement. The U.S. Senate began considering proposals
to amend the blood quantum. Senator Key Pittman of Nevada, the brother
of W.B. Pittman, stated:
In other words, that this shall apply only to Hawaiians who are
of the full blood; and that will rehabilitate only a very few of
them, because there are only about 22,000 full-blooded
Hawaiians, and there can be only two or three hundred
homesteads. I do not believe the Delegate will object to that, that
it be confined to the full blood instead of the half blood, because
he knows and everybody knows that any part Hawaiian is
capable of taking care of himself and does not need any
rehabilitation. 123
McClellan and W.B. Pittman, thus, proposed that the U.S. Senate define
“native Hawaiian” as “any citizen of the Territory being of the Polynesian
race and of the full blood.”124 Robertson added his support: “The privileges
conferred by the bill, clearly, should be limited to Hawaiians of the pure
blood who alone arquire [sic], deserve, or are entitled in the slightest degree
to rehabilitation at the expense of the tax payers of the Territory.” 125
U.S. Senator Harry New, chair of the Senate Committee on the
Territories, expressed his reservations about the bill as drafted. Senator
New, adhering to the arguments and proposals from Robertson, McClellan,
and W.B. Pittman, specifically doubted the constitutionality of the bill
because “it taxes an element of the population of the Island for the
exclusive benefit of another[,]” objected to the one thirty-second blood
quantum language of the bill, and instead urged that the homesteading
program “should be limited to full-blooded Hawaiians.”126

123. See December Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 124.
124. W.B. Pittman, Amendments to Hawaiian Rehabilitation Bill (1921) (available at the
Hawai‘i State Archives); George McClellan, Suggested Amendments to H.R. 13500 by
George McClellan (1921) (available at the Hawai‘i State Archives).
125. Letter from A.G.M. Robertson to Senator Reed Smoot (Jan. 10, 1921) (available at
the Hawai‘i State Archives).
126. Harry S. New, Letter to Prince J. Kuhio Kalanianaole (Feb. 23, 1921) (available at
the Hawai‘i State Archives).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol46/iss1/2

No. 1]

THE HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION ACT

25

At home in Hawai‘i, Kūhiō reported to the territorial legislature about
the changes to the bill being proposed in Congress, including
acknowledging that U.S. Senators wanted to amend the blood quantum
requirement as they believed “the special rights should be accorded only to
persons of one-half, one-fourth, or at most one-eighth Hawaiian blood.” 127
Around the same time, territorial Senator John Wise met with the territorial
governor, the territorial attorney general, and territorial Senators Harry
Baldwin and Harold Rice.128 Both Senators Baldwin and Rice were ardent
supporters of the sugar and ranching industries. 129 These private meetings
resulted in Wise’s introduction of Senate Concurrent Resolution 6, which
authorized the governor to extend sugar leases to planters until Congress
resolved the rehabilitation bill.130 Senate Concurrent Resolution 6 quickly
passed and, according to reporting at the time, helped prove to the business
elite that Senator Wise was serious about appeasing them to gain their
support for the Hawaiian rehabilitation program. 131
Private negotiations were held the following day between Kūhiō, the
governor, Senator Charles Rice, Senator Harold Rice, Senator Harry
Baldwin, Senator Charles Chillingworth, and key members of the territorial
House. 132 The secret negotiations led to Wise’s introduction of Senate
Concurrent Resolution 8, which set forth the new limitations to the
Hawaiian rehabilitation program, including adding language limiting the
program to those of one-half Hawaiian blood. 133 With the support of the
sugar and ranching faction, Senate Concurrent Resolution 8 passed easily in
the territorial Senate. 134 Despite an attempt in the territorial House, which
was comprised of many part-Hawaiian men, to amend the word “one-half”
and replace it with “one eighth,” the representatives ultimately capitulated
to the one-half blood definition of native Hawaiian.135 The deal was struck
when the representatives obtained additional concessions from the opposing

127. See KŪHIŌ REPORT, supra note 88, at 11.
128. See McGregor, Hawaiian Homesteading, supra note 29, at 27.
129. See MEN OF HAWAII, supra note 106, at 31, 223.
130. See McGregor, Hawaiian Homesteading, supra note 29, at 27.
131. See Vause, supra note 44, at 86.
132. See McGregor, Hawaiian Homesteading, supra note 29, at 27; Vause, supra note
44, at 85–87.
133. S. Con. Res. 8, 11th Leg. (Terr. of Haw. 1921), reprinted in SENATE J., 11th Leg., at
670 (Terr. of Haw. 1921).
134. See McGregor, Hawaiian Homesteading, supra note 29, at 29.
135. S. Con. Res. 8, 11th Leg. (Terr. of Haw. 1921), reprinted in HOUSE J., 11th Leg., at
1488 (Terr. of Haw. 1921).
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faction, such as increasing the number of Hawaiians on the Hawaiian
Homes Commission that would administer the rehabilitation program. 136
A new delegation from the Territory pitched the revised definition of
native Hawaiian to Congress. At a hearing before the U.S. House
Committee on Territories—the committee sympathetic to Kūhiō’s initial
contention that Hawaiians were entitled to the rehabilitation program—
territorial Attorney General Harry S. Irwin outlined the “rationale” for the
change in blood quantum:
It was said by the opponents of the bill that a person of onethirty-second Hawaiian blood was to all intents and purposes a
white person; that as a matter of fact you could not tell the
difference between a person having one-thirty-second part of
Hawaiian blood and a white person.137
Territorial Senator Wise was more blunt:
Some people objected to [the one-thirty-second blood quantum]
because it was hard to distinguish between one-thirty-second
Hawaiian and wanted one-half part Hawaiian. Of course, I do
not agree with that part of the amendment, but still, in order to
put the [bill] through, I had to agree to it. 138
Representative James G. Strong of Kansas questioned Wise on what would
happen if the committee restored the one thirty-second blood provision. 139
Wise stated, “Why, I think the Hawaiians, so far as they Hawaiians are
concerned, they would bless you.”140 Chairman Curry of California then
asked whether the “Hawaiians themselves consider[ed] it to be a good
scheme to limit [the program] to full-bloods, or half-bloods[.]”141 Clearly
torn between his own desire to lower the blood quantum requirement and
the deal struck with the plantation elite, 142 Wise responded: “Yes; a large
136. See KAUANUI, supra note 50, at 155–56.
137. Proposed Amendments to the Organic Act of the Territory of Hawaii: Hearings on
H.R. 7257 Before the H. Comm. on the Territories, 67th Cong. 15 (1921), https://www.doi.
gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/HHCA-House-Hearing-June-9-and-10-1921-for-HR-7257.
pdf.
138. Id. at 79.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 80.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 140 (“And I am part-Hawaiian; and I believe that the only salvation of our
people is to intermarry the part Hawaiians with the full-blood Hawaiians. . . . And if the
Hawaiians have a moral right, a legal right, an equitable right, to these lands, I can not see,
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part seem to agree to that.”143 Kūhiō interjected that the change in the blood
quantum requirement was made to appease the objections from the U.S.
Senate: “I called on the [territorial] legislature to ratify just what the Senate
wanted, so that we would have easy going in the Senate.”144 Instead of
advocating for decreasing or eliminating the one-half blood quantum, and
perhaps in recognition of the political writing on the wall, Wise conceded:
“But, as I said, we came over here as beggars, and so we took what we
could get. I was told a long time ago that one of your proverbs was never to
look a gift horse in the mouth, so we took what we could get.”145
The Hawaiian politicians and the U.S. Congress bowed to the power of
the Big Five, and the one-half Hawaiian blood requirement became law.
The push for a high blood quantum requirement was no doubt an effort to
ensure that, with the continued decline in the full blood Hawaiian
population, the HHCA would cease to exist and lands would be returned to
the United States.146
But even more sinister, the arbitrary one-half Hawaiian blood
requirement has permeated for the last century and has been weaponized by
some to effectively discount the authenticity of claims to being Hawaiian
and to selfishly argue for additional resources.147 In 2000, for example, the
U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Rice v. Cayetano in which a white
rancher descended from two of the territorial senators, who fought to
maximize the blood requirement for the HHCA, filed a constitutional
challenge against the State of Hawai‘i for holding a Hawaiian-only election
for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (“OHA”)—a state entity
created to better the conditions of Kānaka Maoli. 148 The five conservative
Supreme Court justices struck down the voting scheme and were joined in a
gentlemen, why the part Hawaiians, the three-quarters blood, the one-quarter blood, or the
two-sixteenths blood, should be cut out and only the people of the full blood or the half
blood get the benefit of it; I can not see why.”).
143. Id. at 80.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See VAN DYKE, supra note 38, at 247 (“Those unenthusiastic about the program
pressed for this high percentage because they hoped that, with the rapid decline of the
Hawaiian population, the program could be phased out and the lands could be released to
others in a relatively short period of time.”).
147. See Day v. Apoliona, 616 F.3d 918, 924–28 (9th Cir. 2010); Kealoha v. Machado,
315 P.3d 213, 225–30 (Haw. 2013); see KAUANUI, supra note 50, at 171–96 (exploring “how
the colonial legacies of blood quantum politics continue to impact contemporary Native
Hawaiian struggles for land and recognition”).
148. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 498–99 (2000).
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concurring opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer, who despite being a
consistent liberal voice on the highest court, supported the notion of
imposing a “limit” to who should be considered Hawaiian:
There must . . . be . . . some limit on what is reasonable, at the
least when a State (which is not itself a tribe) creates the
definition. And to define that membership in terms of 1 possible
ancestor out of 500, thereby creating a vast and unknowable
body of potential members—leaving some combination of luck
and interest to determine which potential members become
actual voters—goes well beyond any reasonable limit. 149
As another example of the divisiveness of blood quantum, some fifty
percent native Hawaiians have challenged programs benefiting all
Hawaiians. In 2005, in an attempt to maximize funding and resources for
native Hawaiians, several native Hawaiian men filed suit against OHA
alleging that the entity violated its legal responsibilities when expending
funds to cultural, language, and self-determination programs and initiatives
that benefitted all Hawaiians at the expense of supporting only native
Hawaiians as defined by the HHCA.150
The fifty percent rule has clearly served as a tool to further divide
Hawaiians. As aptly articulated by others, the HHCA was inherently flawed
because it was “rooted in racism and shot through with paternalism.” 151 In
the words of Professor Kauanui: “Blood quantum is a manifestation of
settler colonialism that works to deracinate—to pull out by the roots—and
displace indigenous peoples.”152 The racialization of Hawaiians through the
imposition of a blood quantum requirement has limited those that can
149. Id. at 527 (Breyer, J., concurring).
150. Day v. Apoliona, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Haw. 2006); see also Brief for The Hou
Hawaiians and Maui Loa, Native Hawaiian Beneficiaries as Amici Curiae at 10, Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818), 1999 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 667, at *13–14
(May 27, 1999) (“OHA is doing the same thing. OHA wants a person who is one-half
Filipino, one-quarter Japanese, one-eighth Caucasian, one-sixteenth Chinese and onesixteenth Hawaiian to be given the same benefits as a person who is one-half Hawaiian. How
can such a person make a claim to participate as an equal beneficiary with a person who is
one-half Hawaiian?”).
151. Lesley Karen Friedman, Native Hawaiians, Self-Determination, and the Inadequacy
of the State Land Trusts, 14 UNIV. HAW. L. REV. 519, 563 (1992). Paternalism was reflected
in the HHCA because native Hawaiians become wards of the government by having to pay
rent for the lands, instead of being given lands fee simple. This was the same scheme
implemented against Native Americans by the federal government through the Dawes Act.
152. See KAUANUI, supra note 50, at 9.
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obtain a homestead and has divided the community. 153 Is this what Kūhiō
envisioned as justice?
III. Enough Is Enough: Analyzing the Government’s
Continued Breaches of Trust
WE THE HAWAIIAN PEOPLE have waited too long. What good
is filling out an application when land is not made available for
homesteading. . . . I must defy the law and I trust in doing so I
will expose the foibles and failings of an institution which for too
long as been a slave to big money and big business and
seemingly forgotten who its real beneficiaries are.154
– Sonny A. Kaniho, 1974

153. Although inherently racist, the irony of the HHCA is that it provided an important
acknowledgment of the trust responsibility that the United States has toward native
Hawaiians, which is akin to that of Native Americans. Following the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Morton v. Mancari, and the constant threat of reverse racism challenges,
the HHCA has been the linchpin law that advocates have trumpeted to highlight how the
federal government has recognized a unique trust relationship that entitles all laws uniquely
dealing with Kānaka Maoli as subject to rational basis review as opposed to strict scrutiny.
417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). Under this argument, native Hawaiians are a recognized political
classification given the recognition under the HHCA and other laws and not a racial
classification. See Troy J.H. Andrade, Legacy in Paradise: Analyzing the Obama
Administration’s Efforts of Reconciliation with Native Hawaiians, 22 MICH. J. RACE & L.
273, 311–16 (2017); see also Procedures for Reestablishing a Formal Government-toGovernment Relationship with the Native Hawaiian Community, 81 Fed. Reg. 71278 (Oct.
14, 2016) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 50) (noting that native Hawaiian beneficiaries play a
significant role in President Barack Obama’s Rule that provides a process for federal
recognition of a Hawaiian Governing Entity). Were the federal government to provide
federal recognition for a native Hawaiian governing body, an important question of who
could participate in such a governing body would need to be decided. The current
administrative rules require the “Native Hawaiian community” to determine for itself who
would be eligible to vote to ratify a governing document; this list of voters to ratify the
governing document must include beneficiaries of the HHCA. See 43 C.F.R. § 50.12 (2020).
The “Native Hawaiian community” is defined as “the distinct Native Hawaiian indigenous
political community that Congress, exercising its plenary power over Native American
affairs, has recognized and with which Congress has implemented a special political and
trust relationship.” 43 C.F.R. § 50.4 (2020).
154. Sonny A. Kaniho, Homestead Land Is Claimed, ANOTHER VOICE..., May 9, 1974, at
1, reprinted in IAN LIND, SONNY KANIHO: HOMESTEADER, LEADER, HAWAIIAN 4 (2009),
https://hawaiianhomesteads.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/SonnyKanihoBook.pdf.
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Both the length of the list and the length of the wait make the
vast majority of Native Hawaiian people despair of ever
receiving an award of land.155
– Senator Michael Crozier, 1999
Enough is enough. We have been in court for over 20 years—
December 1999, lawsuit filed, seven judges—and we’re not pau
yet. Let’s get this resolved before more kupuna hala (die),
including myself.156
– Leona Kalima, 2019
For thirty-eight years following the creation of the rehabilitation
program, the United States assumed duties of trustee of the Hawaiian Home
Lands program. In 1959, as a condition of statehood, the United States
transferred most of its administrative obligations under the HHCA to the
newly formed State of Hawai‘i. 157 The federal government, however,
retained oversight responsibilities over certain aspects of the HHCA,
including approving any amendments to the HHCA that the state legislature
enacted to alter the blood quantum qualifications of lessees. 158 The state
nevertheless accepted and even incorporated these trust responsibilities
toward homestead beneficiaries into its Constitution. 159
Today, the day-to-day management of the HHCA rests with the State
Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (“DHHL”), which is governed by the
155. Kalima v. State (Kalima II), 468 P.3d 143, 146 (Haw. 2020) (citation omitted)
(quoting Sen. Michael Crozier, Testimony Before the Hawai‘i Advisory Comm., U.S.
Comm’n on Civil Rights (Aug. 2, 1990)).
156. Vicki Viotti, Name in the News: Leona Kalima, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER,
Nov. 22, 2019, at A17 (quoting Leona Kalima).
157. An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union, Pub. L.
No. 86-3, § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4, 6 (1959).
158. Id. §§ 4–5, 73 Stat. at 5–6. In making this transfer, the United States “reaffirmed the
trust relationship which existed between the United States and the Hawaiian people by
retaining the exclusive power to enforce the [Hawaiian Homes] trust, including the power to
approve land exchanges, and legislative amendments affecting the rights of beneficiaries
under such Act.” 2 U.S.C. § 11701(15); see Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 944 (9th Cir.
2003) (“Even though the United States granted Hawaii title to the HHCA lands, it reserved
to itself a right of consent to any changes in the homestead lease qualifications.”); see also
HAW. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1, 3 (“[A]ny amendment to increase the benefits to lessees of
Hawaiian home lands may be made in the constitution, or in the manner required for state
legislation, but the qualifications of lessees shall not be changed except with the consent of
the United States . . . .”).
159. HAW. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-3.
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Hawaiian Homes Commission (“Commission”).160 The Commission is
comprised of nine members appointed by the governor and confirmed by
the senate. 161 Eight of those members represent the islands for which there
are trust lands.162 The ninth member of the Commission is the chairperson,
who also serves as the director of DHHL and as a member of the governor’s
cabinet. 163 Based on the HHCA, as revised, the Commission awards
qualified native Hawaiian beneficiaries homestead leases for residential,
agricultural, pastoral, or aquacultural use for up to a 199-year term at a rate
of $1.00 per year.164
For most of its century-long existence, the administration of the HHCA
received little to no scrutiny and the financial support from the federal and
state governments was abysmal. In addition, while the State has made
efforts to expand the reach of the HHCA to beneficiaries of less blood
quantum, the federal government has been unwilling to consent to these
basic changes.165 When combined with a poor land base, insufficient water
resources, and illegal transfers of trust land for little or no compensation,
the admirable goals of the Hawaiian Home Lands program have been
severely undercut. In the years following statehood, the program suffered
from serious structural problems and was historically underfunded, which

160. HAW. REV. STAT. § 202(a) (2013).
161. Id.
162. Id. The HHCA provides that the HHC be composed of three members from O‘ahu,
one member from West Hawai‘i, one member from East Hawai‘i, one member from
Moloka‘i, one member from Maui, and one member from Kaua‘i. See id.
163. HAW. REV. STAT. § 26-17 (2013). Four of the nine Commission members must be at
least one-quarter Hawaiian ancestry. HAW. REV. STAT. § 202(a).
164. The state legislature passed in 1990 and Congress approved in 1992 a modification
of the lease terms to extend the lease period for another 100 years. Act of July 3, 1990, No.
305, 1990 Haw. Sess. Laws 954, https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH1990/
SLH1990_Act305.pdf (amending section 208 of the HHCA to extend the initial ninety-nine
year lease term to not more than one hundred ninety-nine years); Hawaiian Home
Commission Amendments, Pub. L. No. 102-398, 106 Stat. 195 (1992).
165. Act of Apr. 5, 2002, No. 12, 2002 Haw. Sess. Laws 58, https://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH2002/SLH2002_Act12.pdf (amending section 208(5) of the
HHCA by authorizing a homestead lessee who is at least one-quarter Hawaiian and who has
received an interest in the tract through succession or transfer to transfer his or her leasehold
interest to a brother or sister who is at least one-quarter Hawaiian); Act of Apr. 20, 2005,
No. 16, 2005 Haw. Sess. Laws 18, https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH2005/
SLH2005_Act16.pdf (amending section 209(1)(a) of the HHCA by authorizing a homestead
lessee to designate a brother or sister who is at least one-quarter Hawaiian to succeed to the
leasehold interest upon the death of the lessee).
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forced it to lease the best lands to non-Hawaiians to generate basic
operating funds.166
For example, Parker Ranch, the same entity that sent former Territorial
Chief Justice Robertson to advocate against passage of the HHCA, received
significant parcels of leased lands to continue its ranching operations. 167 In
the early 1970s, and as alluded to at the beginning of this Article, a group
called The Hawaiians led protests throughout the state challenging DHHL’s
failure to rehabilitate native Hawaiians through the Hawaiian Home Lands
program. 168 Pae Galdeira, the leader of The Hawaiians, organized an
occupation of Parker Ranch with Hawai‘i Island rancher Sonny Kaniho,
and others including Francis Kauhane, Chris Yuen, Ian Lind, Mary Mae
Unea, Joe Tassil and Moanikeala Akaka, to call attention to the State’s
failed effort to house more than 2,000 native Hawaiian families that awaited
a homestead.169 Kaniho argued in 1974:
WE THE HAWAIIAN PEOPLE have waited too long. What
good is filling out an application when land is not made available
for homesteading. . . . I must defy the law and I trust in doing so
I will expose the foibles and failings of an institution which for
too long as been a slave to big money and big business and
seemingly forgotten who its real beneficiaries are.170
The group pried open a cattle gate, said a prayer, and sat. 171 Law
enforcement arrived and arrested the occupiers. 172 The occupation, which
received extensive media attention, served as a watershed moment in
pushing the State to live up to its obligations. 173
Although reforms were implemented and strides were made to
rehabilitate Hawai‘i’s indigenous people, the Hawaiian Home Lands
program is still criticized by beneficiaries, the public, and the state
government. As of December 2020, 9,957 native Hawaiian individuals hold
166. See VAN DYKE, supra note 38, at 250–51.
167. Troy J.H. Andrade, Changing Tides: A Political and Legal History of the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs 24–26 (2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai‘i at
Mānoa) (on file with the Hamilton and School of Law Libraries, University of Hawai‘i at
Mānoa).
168. Id.
169. LIND, supra note 154, at 2–18.
170. Kaniho, supra note 154, at 1, reprinted in LIND, supra note 154, at 4.
171. See LIND, supra note 154, at 8–17.
172. Id. at 18–19.
173. Andrade, Hawai‘i ‘78, supra note 1, at 110; see Helen Altonn, Squatting Surprises
State Aides, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, May 21, 1974, at 2.
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homestead leases.174 As of June 30, 2020, there are 28,730 applicants
waiting to receive the lands promised by the federal and state
governments.175 Of more than 200,000-acres of land within the program,
only approximately 33,000 acres are currently being used for
homesteads.176 The following table illustrates the growing waiting list and
the significantly slow pace at which lands were made available for
homesteading in the last two decades:177
174. 2021 Legislative Fact Sheet, DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, http://dhhl.
hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2021-DHHL-Legislative-Handout-8.5x11-FINAL.
pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
175. Applicant Waiting List Up to June 30, 2020, DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS 6,
https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2020-6-30_07-Alpha_A-K_Waitlist_
279pgs_FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2022).
176. See VAN DYKE, supra note 38, at 251.
177. See DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 12, 13 (2021),
https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/DHHL-Annual-Report-FY-20.pdf;
DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 59, 63 (2020),
https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2019-DHHL-AnnualReport-ICROFINAL-with-COVER.pdf; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, FISCAL YEAR 2017-2018
ANNUAL REPORT 58, 63 (2019), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2018DHHL-AnnualReport-ICROv3.pdf (for 2018 numbers); DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS,
2017 ANNUAL REPORT 59, 63 (2018), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/
DHHL-Annual-Report-2017-FINAL.pdf; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2016 ANNUAL
REPORT 48, 52 (2017), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Annual
Report2016DHHL.pdf; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 44, 48
(2016),
https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/DHHL-AnnualReport2015Interior-011119-FINAL-Upload.pdf; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, ANNUAL REPORT
2014, at 42, 46 (2015), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/DHHL-AnnualReport-2014-Web.pdf; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 38, 42
(2014), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/DHHL-Annual-Report-2013Web.pdf; HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 51, 56 (2013), https://dhhl.
hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/DHHL-Annual-Report-2012-Web.pdf; HAWAIIAN
HOME LANDS TRUST, ANNUAL REPORT 2010-2011, at 47, 52 (2012), https://dhhl.
hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/HHL_AR_2011.pdf (for 2011 numbers); DEP’T OF
HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 55, 61 (2011), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/HHL_AR_2010.pdf ; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2009
ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2010), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/HHL_AR
_2009.pdf; Applicant Waiting List Up to December 31, 2009, DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME
LANDS 5, https://web.archive.org/web/20101209141222/http://hawaii.gov/dhhl/applicationwait-list/12-31-09/2009-12-31_07-Alpha_A-K_Waitlist_245pgs.pdf (last visited Apr. 23,
2022);; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 12, 14 (2009),
https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/HHL_AR_2008.pdf;
DEP’T
OF
HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 13, 15 (2008), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/HHL_AR_2007.pdf; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2006
ANNUAL REPORT 13, 16 (2007), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/
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TABLE A. Total “native Hawaiians” on the Waiting List
and Total Lessees
Fiscal
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

Number on
Waiting List
19,302
19,600
20,000
20,489
21,000
21,738
22,893
23,668
24,296
25,244
25,564
26,170
26,550
26,926
27,341
27,616
27,855
28,123
28,306
28,590
28,788

Total Number
of Lessees
6,927
7,192
7,292
7,350
7,418
7,827
8,418
9,110
9,539
9,748
9,836
9,922
9,849
9,850
9,838
9,821
9,813
9,876
9,877
9,898
9,933

11/HHL_AR_2006.pdf; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 11, 13
(2006), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/HHL_AR_2005.pdf; DEP’T OF
HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2005), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/HHL_AR_2004.pdf; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 2003
ANNUAL REPORT 6, 8 (2004), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/HHL_
AR_2003.pdf; DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2001-02, at 6, 10
(2003),
https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/DHHL-Annual-Report2002.pdf (for 2002 numbers); DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 200001, at 5, 9 (2002), https://web.archive.org/web/20040117091538fw_/http://www.hawaii.
gov/dhhl/annualrpt01.pdf (for 2001 numbers); DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, ANNUAL
REPORT FY 1999-00, at 6, 10 (2001), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/
01-DHHL-ANNUAL-RPT-1999-2000.pdf (for 2000 numbers).
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As discussed further below, these jarring statistics first reflect an agency
historically devalued and marginalized. Second, these numbers highlight
two interrelated problems that have plagued DHHL: a lack of funding and a
burgeoning waiting list for a homestead.
A. Resolving Breaches of Trust
In 1983, following a beneficiary lawsuit, a Joint Federal and State Task
Force issued a report that identified decades of mismanagement and
breaches of trust.178 The state’s trust duties owed to native Hawaiians are,
according to the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i, evaluated using “the most
exacting fiduciary standards,” which are “determined by examining wellsettled principles enunciated by the federal courts regarding lands set aside
by Congress in trust for the benefit of other native Americans, i.e.,
American Indians, Eskimos, and Alaskan natives.”179 These trust duties
included: (1) the obligation to administer the trust solely in the interest of
the beneficiary; and (2) the use of reasonable skills and care to make trust
property productive. 180 Nevertheless, the Task Force identified many
challenges DHHL faced, including, but not limited to, “substantial
problems” with the State meeting its fiduciary obligations to the
beneficiaries, the “slow” distribution of leases, inadequate staffing, “grossly
insufficient” information management systems, the unauthorized transfer of
over 30,000 acres of land by the State to benefit other agencies,
departments, and individuals, and the misuse of Hawaiian Home Lands to
benefit the general public rather than beneficiaries with little or no
compensation to DHHL.181
The Task Force also made recommendations to address these breaches of
trust. The State took action. The governor, for example, unilaterally
cancelled gubernatorial executive orders and proclamations that removed
land from the trust to be used for other public purposes. 182 In 1988, the
178. FEDERAL-STATE TASK FORCE ON THE HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION ACT, REPORT
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
HAWAII (1983) [hereinafter FEDERAL-STATE TASK FORCE REPORT].
179. Ahuna v. Dep’t of Hawaiian Home Lands, 640 P.2d 1161, 1168–69 (Haw. 1982).
180. Id. at 1169.
181. FEDERAL-STATE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 178, at 21–22, 26–27.
182. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NO. 92-I-641, AUDIT
REPORT : HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 9 (Mar. 1992),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/hhl-ig-audit-report-march-1992.pdf (“For example,
the Governor of Hawaii in December 1984 canceled and withdrew 19 of the 34 Executive
orders and withdrew 8 of the 9 proclamations. This action returned to the Homes
Commission approximately 27,854 of the 30,166 total acres previously transferred to
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Hawai‘i state legislature passed the Native Hawaiian Trusts Judicial Relief
Act. 183 This law provided beneficiaries with the right to file a lawsuit
against the State to enforce the provisions of the HHCA for breaches that
occurred after July 1, 1988.184 The Act also required the governor to create
an action plan to resolve beneficiary claims for past breaches of trust from
1959 to 1988.185 The governor’s failure to create a plan resulted in the
beneficiaries having a right to file suit retroactively for all past breach of
trust claims since the State assumed responsibility of the program in
1959.186
In accordance with the law, in 1991 the legislature adopted thenGovernor John Waihe‘e’s Action Plan to Address Controversies Under the
Hawaiian Home Lands Trust and the Public Land Trust.187 The Action Plan
recommended two parallel processes to resolve the past breaches of trust
from 1959 to 1988: (1) establishing a gubernatorial task force to settle
breach of trust claims impacting the entire trust; and (2) creating a claims
panel to resolve individual beneficiary claims of losses due to the State’s
breaches of trust.188
1. Settling the State’s Pre-1988 Misuse of Trust Lands
For the first process, and to investigate DHHL land and title claims,
Governor Waihe‘e convened a task force comprised of representatives from
DHHL, the state Department of Land and Natural Resources, the state
Department of the Attorney General, and the Office of State Planning. 189
This task force, with no beneficiary representation, proposed a onetime $39
million settlement for the State’s misuse of 29,633 acres of land in

nonbeneficiaries.”); OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF HAW., AN ACTION PLAN TO
ADDRESS CONTROVERSIES UNDER THE HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS TRUST AND THE PUBLIC LAND
TRUST 35 (1991) (available at the Hawai‘i State Archives) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN].
183. Act of Jun 17, 1988, No. 395, 1988 Haw. Sess. Laws 942 (codified at HAW. REV.
STAT. § 673-1 to -10), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH1988/SLH1988_Act
395.pdf.
184. HAW. REV. STAT. § 673-2 (2013).
185. Act of June 17, 1988, No. 395, § 5, 1988 Haw. Sess. Laws at 945.
186. Id.
187. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 182.
188. Id.
189. Act of June 29, 1995, No. 14, 1995 Haw. Sess. Laws 696, https://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH1995/SLH1995SS_Act14.pdf.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol46/iss1/2

No. 1]

THE HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION ACT

37

exchange for DHHL’s agreement to waive the rights of beneficiaries to all
past and future claims. 190
Native Hawaiian beneficiaries filed suit challenging the validity of the
settlement. 191 The court in Ka‘ai‘ai v. Drake granted the beneficiaries a
preliminary injunction, which halted the settlement process, appointed an
“independent representative” for the beneficiaries, and ordered a reappraisal
of the breach of trust claim. 192 The legislature subsequently approved the
new reappraisal settlement through the passage of Act 14 in 1995.193
Act 14, which settled claims for the illegal conveyance or use of trust
lands between 1959 and 1988, created a trust fund for DHHL to support its
infrastructure and capital development projects, and transferred 16,518
acres of state land to the trust, bringing the land corpus to its original
acreage of approximately 203,500 acres. 194 The new settlement amount, as
approved by the legislature, for the past breaches totaled $600 million—a
far cry of the initial $39 million offered. 195 Over the next twenty years,
DHHL would be provided with $30 million annually to compensate for the
State’s breaches to the whole trust.196 Importantly, the legislature expressly
stated that this settlement payment would “not diminish the funds the
department is entitled to under Article XII, section 1” of the Hawai‘i
Constitution—those “sufficient sums” necessary to administer the
program. 197
2. 1991 Individual Claims Resolution Under the Hawaiian Home Lands
Trust Act
The second process under the governor’s Action Plan addressed the way
in which individuals could seek and potentially receive redress for personal
losses or harm suffered through breaches of the State’s fiduciary
obligations. In 1991, the legislature passed Act 323, which was codified as
Hawaii Revised Statutes chapter 674, and created a process by which a
190. Elizabeth Ann Ho‘oipo Kala‘ena‘auao Pa Martin, David Lynn Martin, David &
Campbell Penn, and Joyce E. McCarty, Cultures in Conflict in Hawai'i: The Law and
Politics of Native Hawaiian Water Rights, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 71, 178 (1996) [hereinafter
Martin et al., Cultures in Conflict].
191. Ka‘ai‘ai v. Drake, Civ. No. 92-3642-10 (Haw. 1st Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 1992).
192. See Martin et al., Cultures in Conflict, supra note 190, at 178–79.
193. Act of June 29, 1995, No. 14, 1995 Haw. Sess. Laws 696, https://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH1995/SLH1995SS_Act14.pdf.
194. Id. § 2.
195. Id. § 6.
196. Id.
197. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
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newly established Individual Claims Review Panel (“Panel”) would review
all individual beneficiaries’ claims and submit a final report for all claims to
the 1993 and 1994 legislatures.198 The Panel’s final report needed to
provide “a summary of each claim brought before the panel, the panel’s
findings and advisory opinion regarding the merits of each claim, and an
estimate of the probable compensation or recommended corrective action
by the State.”199 Once received and reviewed, the legislature could choose
to adopt the recommendations and award compensation or require
corrective action. 200 If an individual claimant was not satisfied with the
legislature’s decisions regarding their breach of trust claim, the claimant
would be provided with a right to sue in the state circuit court for actual
damages. 201
Because of delays in creating the Panel, the legislature extended the
deadline for beneficiaries to file claims with the Panel and the deadline for
the Panel to file its report.202 The legislature also provided claimants with
three additional years to notify that Panel that they did not accept the
legislative action and an additional three years for filing an action in
court.203 In 1997, the Panel submitted its first report, which concluded that
2,752 claimants filed 4,327 claims against the State.204 Of those claims
submitted, 67 percent involved claimants who “had been waiting an
unreasonable amount of time for a homestead award” or claimants with
“waiting list claims with other issues.” 205 The Panel determined that 165
claims of the 172 reviewed by that time were meritorious, and
recommended the legislature award $6.7 million in damages to those
meritorious claimants.206

198. Individual Claims Resolution Under the Hawaiian Homes Trust Act, Act of July 2,
1991, No. 323, 1991 Haw. Sess. Laws 990 (codified as amended at HAW. REV. STAT. §§
674-1 to -21 (2013)), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH1991/SLH1991_Act
323.pdf.
199. Id. sec. 1, § 14, 1991 Haw. Sess. Laws at 995.
200. Id. sec. 1, § 1, 1991 Haw. Sess. Laws at 991.
201. Id. sec. 1, § 17, 1991 Haw. Sess. Laws at 995.
202. Act of July 1, 1993, No. 351, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 991, https://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH1993/SLH1993_Act351.pdf.
203. Id. sec. 11, § 674-17, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws at 994–95.
204. Kalima v. State (Kalima I), 137 P.3d 990, 997 (Haw. 2006).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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The legislature took issue with the Panel’s formula for calculating the
award amounts and insisted that all claims be reviewed at one time. 207 The
legislature, therefore, denied the Panel’s recommendations on the claims,
but provided the Panel with two more years to report on all of the claims. 208
In addition, and in what appeared to be an attempt to undermine the Panel’s
determinations, the legislature created a working group of state
administrators to determine “a formula and any criteria necessary to qualify
and resolve all claims” for the State’s breaches of trust.209 Unsurprisingly,
the working group’s criteria for resolving these individual claims differed
substantially from the Panel’s criteria. The new working group’s criteria
also resulted in the elimination of approximately sixty percent of the
individualized claims. 210
Beneficiaries filed suit against the State arguing that the working group
was “biased and its proposed formula, inter alia, violated their right to due
process of the law.”211 The court agreed that concluded that “the members
of the Working Group appeared to be biased as a result of (1) their official
positions and (2) the fact that several of them had testified before the
legislature against the types of claims they later found to be noncompensable . . . .”212 The court, thus, enjoined “the members of the
Working Group from taking any further action in determining the formula
for compensation.”213
In 1999, the Panel submitted another report to the legislature indicating
the Panel had “either closed or issued recommendation on 2,050 claims,
representing 47% of the total number of claims” and recommending
damages for those meritorious claims totaling $16,434,675.75.214 The Panel
also sought an extension to complete the remaining fifty-three percent of
the claims. 215 While the legislature agreed to another year extension for the
Panel to review the individualized claims, Governor Benjamin Cayetano—a
politician with a record critical of Hawaiian issues 216—vetoed the bill. 217

207. Act of July 8, 1997, No. 382, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 1208, https://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH1997/SLH1997_Act382.pdf.
208. Id. sec. 4, § 674-4, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws at 1209–10.
209. Id. § 2, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws at 1209.
210. Kalima I, 137 P.3d at 998.
211. Apa v. Cayetano, Civ. No. 97-4641-11 (Haw. 1st Cir. Ct. Dec. 30, 1998).
212. Kalima I, 137 P.3d at 998.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 999.
215. Id.
216. See Andrade, Hawai‘i ‘78, supra note 1, at 131–44.
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Thus, the Panel submitted its final report to the legislature at the end of
1999, adding sixty more meritorious claims totaling $1,536,146.99.218
On December 29, 1999, 2,721 plaintiff-claimants filed a class action
lawsuit against the State. 219 Of these 2,721 claimants, the Panel adjudicated
and presented claims of 418 claimants to the legislature. 220 The legislature
did not award any money or relief to these plaintiffs, who were represented
in the lawsuit by class representative Raynette Nalani Ah Chong, Special
Administrator of the Estate of Joseph Ching. 221 The other class of fiftythree plaintiffs, represented by Dianne Boner, had their claims considered
by the Panel, but the claims were not presented to the legislature. 222 The
final class of 2,250 plaintiff-claimants timely filed their claims, but the
Panel failed to render an opinion, so the legislature did not make a decision
on those claims. Leona Kalima represented this final class of plaintiffs. 223
In their lawsuit, the plaintiffs asserted that the State breached its trust to
beneficiaries of the HHCA between 1959 and 1988 because of its: “(1)
mismanagement of the extensive waiting list; (2) mishandling of the
plaintiff’s applications; (3) preference policies regarding eligibility
requirements; and (4) the awarding of raw lands lacking infrastructure.” 224
The State, however, argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to pursue
their dispute in court because they were not “aggrieved individual
claimants” and therefore, never completed the administrative process
required by law.225 Under the State’s rationale, the plaintiffs’ claims were
barred because they failed to obtain an advisory opinion from the Panel
following a review of a claim, they failed to receive affirmative action from
the legislature, and they failed to file a written notice rejecting the
legislature’s action. 226
217. Benjamin Cayetano, Governor’s Message No. 241, Statement of Objections to
House Bill No. 1675 (Haw. June 10, 1999), reprinted in H.R. JOURNAL, 20th Leg., Reg.
Sess. 882 (Haw. 1999).
218. Kalima I, 137 P.3d at 999.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1000.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 992.
225. Id. at 1007–08.
226. Id. (noting that the State argued that: “(1) the beneficiary had to file a claim with the
Panel by August 31, 1995 (or it would “forever be barred”); (2) the Panel had to render an
advisory opinion on the claim and send it to the [l]egislature for action; (3) the [l]egislature
had to take action on the Panel's opinion; and (4) the beneficiary must [have] file[d] a
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The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i in Kalima I (2006) disagreed. Writing for
a unanimous court, Chief Justice Ronald T.Y. Moon determined that the
plaintiffs were “aggrieved individual claimants” for purposes of Hawai‘i
Revised Statutes chapter 674, which required Panel review and legislative
action on each claim. 227 The Court first held that the Panel “reviewed” all of
the claims when each claim was (1) accepted or rejected for further
investigation, and then (2) submitted to the legislature. 228 Second, the Court
concluded that the legislature’s failure to fund claims constituted legislative
“action.”229 The Court ultimately remanded the case to allow the claimants
to pursue their individualized breach of trust claims against the State. 230
On November 3, 2009, a decade after the lawsuit was filed, the trial court
issued a liability order concluding that the State breached the following four
duties as trustee from 1959 to 1988: “(1) the duty to keep and render
accounts; (2) the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill; (3) the duty to
administer the trust; and (4) the duty to make the trust property
productive.”231 The trial court specifically concluded:
Plaintiffs have proven by clear and convincing evidence
breaches of trust by Defendants State and DHHL during the
claims period and that the individual and/or cumulative effects of
such breaches caused by acts or omission by employees of the
State in the management and disposition of trust resources were
a legal cause of harm to the Plaintiffs herein which are
compensable . . . thus necessitating further proceedings to
determine the amount of damages, if any, each subclass member
proves s/he sustained as a result of the breaches during the claim
period. 232
The plaintiffs and the State filed simultaneous motions that proposed
distinct methods for calculating damages. 233 The trial court ultimately
adopted a Fair Market Rental Value (“FMRV”) model to estimate the actual
loss each individual beneficiary incurred. 234 The State, again, appealed. For
written notice rejecting the [l]egislature's action, by October 1, 1999”).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1008–09.
229. Id. at 1010–11.
230. Id. at 1018–19.
231. Kalima II, 468 P.3d 143, 150 (Haw. 2020).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 151.
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lead plaintiff Kalima, the prolonged litigation process was becoming
unbearable: “Enough is enough. We have been in court for over 20 years—
December 1999, lawsuit filed, seven judges—and we’re not pau [done] yet.
Let’s get this resolved before more kupuna hala [die], including myself.”235
In 2020, in another unanimous decision, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court
delivered a victory to the claimants. Writing for the Court, Associate Justice
Paula A. Nakayama, who was the last remaining justice from the Court that
decided Kalima I fourteen years earlier, framed the decision as one of
righting an unnecessarily delayed wrong:
In 1990, Senator Michael Crozier observed, “[b]oth the length of
the list and the length of the wait make the vast majority of
Native Hawaiian people despair of ever receiving an award of
land.” In the thirty years since Senator Crozier’s statement, the
State of Hawaii has done little to address the ever-lengthening
waitlist for lease awards of Hawaiian home lands. 236
In this appeal, the central issue before the Court was whether the trial
court’s FMRV damages model calculates individual damages in a method
permitted by Hawaii Revised Statutes chapter 674.237 Justice Nakayama
highlighted the State’s complicity in this litigation:
It is undisputed that the State breached its duties to keep and
render accounts, to exercise reasonable care and skill, to
administer the trust, and to make the trust property productive, to
the significant detriment of the Native Hawaiian people for
whom the Trust was created. The State’s decision to continue to
litigate this case for decades has compounded the challenges
resultant from its own failure to keep adequate records . . . .238
Justice Nakayama then acknowledged that the FMRV model was not “a
perfectly accurate measure of actual damages,” but criticized the State:
“However, the State has failed to supply a more accurate model. Moreover,
the State’s own wrongful acts, most notably the State’s failure to keep
adequate records, have brought about the uncertainty of the actual damages

235. Viotti, supra note 156 (quoting Leona Kalima).
236. Kalima II, 468 P.3d at 146 (citation omitted) (quoting Sen. Michael Crozier,
Testimony Before the Hawai‘i Advisory Comm., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights (Aug. 2,
1990)).
237. Id. at 156.
238. Id. at 157.
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caused by its breaches.”239 Furthermore, Justice Nakayama was clear that
the Court would liberally interpret the individual claims resolution scheme:
It is in the interests of justice to construe [Hawaii Revised
Statutes] Chapter 674 in a manner that permits the advancement
of this case to the final stages of its resolution and to thereby
afford a fair remedy to the beneficiaries who have for decades
been deprived of the opportunity to lease their native land from
the State.240
By affirming the FMRV model, the Court approved the path for claims to
be processed and claimants—beneficiaries of the HHCA—to be paid.
After the decision, lead plaintiff Kalima rejoiced, “I think it’s
monumental for Native Hawaiians. We got such a great victory, one that
will result in something that is payable.” 241 One of Kalima’s attorneys, Carl
Varady, who along with Tom Grande fought for decades to provide justice
for these beneficiaries, called the decision “a monumental testament to
justice as a general matter and fairness for Native Hawaiians in this
process.”242 Striking a pessimistic tone, plaintiff Raynette Ah Chong
expected the State to prolong the process: “Every time we go two steps
forward, they appeal. . . . It’s been a long trek. I don’t know if this is the
beginning of the end. Is it?”243 Ah Chong’s reluctance was understandable
given the State’s documented and acknowledged record of reneging on its
promises. But perhaps the cautionary note reflected the reality that Ah
Chong was a plaintiff as the administrator of the estate of Joseph Ching,
who passed away during the pendency of this litigation. Like Ching, Joseph
Damian Delaginte, Sr., Lucille Oiliokalani Waikiki, William Ekau Lanai,
Ellen Kapaki Kalikikane, Louise Frida Mahelona, Ethel Makahala
Christensen, Robert Kamakauliuli Kanahele, Sr., and nearly 400 other
claimants died waiting for the State to make amends. 244 Is this what Kūhiō
envisioned as justice? As of the writing of this Article, the State has yet to
pay the individual claims in the Kalima litigation. In addition, although the
239. Id.
240. Id. at 156.
241. Rob Perez, Breach of Trust, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER, July 1, 2020, at A1, A8.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Kalima I, 137 P.3d 990, 1000 n.14 (Haw. 2006); see also Anita Hofschneider,
Court: Hawaiians Deserve Compensation for State’s Poor Oversight of Homelands,
HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT (July 2, 2020), https://www.civilbeat.org/2020/07/court-hawaiiansdeserve-compensation-for-states-poor-oversight-of-homelands/.
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Kalima litigation made it possible for native Hawaiian beneficiaries to
pursue damages against the State for, among other things, prolonging their
status on the waiting list, the lawsuit has yet to solve the issue that most of
the beneficiaries do not have land for residential or agricultural use.
B. Insufficient Funding
While the State appears to be nearing the end of a three-decade process
to resolve some of its breaches of trust from statehood to 1988, the
problems of DHHL—such as an ever-growing waiting list of beneficiaries
and a prolonged period of time for leases to be awarded—persist.245 The
most significant problem is that the state and federal governments have not
provided DHHL with adequate funds to support the department and develop
the lands given under the HHCA. Indeed, the federal government provided
no funding mechanism to support the program during the territorial period,
and, for thirty years following statehood, the state provided no general
funding for the administration of DHHL and left it up to the department to
pay its own operating costs.246 Under this structure, the state forced DHHL
to lease trust lands to non-beneficiaries to raise these necessary operating
funds.247 This general leasing practice diverted potentially valuable
homestead lands to non-Hawaiians and left DHHL with the remaining
lands, with location and topographic characteristics that made developing
them more expensive.248

245. See HAWAI‘I ADVISORY COMM., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A BROKEN TRUST—
THE HAWAIIAN HOMELANDS PROGRAM : SEVENTY YEARS OF FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL AND
STATE GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS 23 (1991)
[hereinafter HAWAI‘I ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT] (reporting that lack of infrastructure
and the impossibility of “securing adequate financing” are major causes of the extensive
waiting list).
246. From 1967 to 1973, the state provided some general funds to DHHL for educational
programs but not for operating expenses. See, e.g., Act of May 11, 1967, No. 54, § 2, 1967
Haw. Sess. Laws 40, 56, https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH1967/SLH1967_
Act54.pdf; Act of June 30, 1970, No. 175, § 2, 1970 Haw. Sess. Laws 326, 346,
https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH1970/SLH1970_Act175.pdf.
247. S. REP. NO. 107-66, at 14 (2001) (“For the next forty years, during the Territorial
period (1921– 1959) and the first two decades of statehood (1959–1978), inadequate funding
forced the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands to lease its best lands to non-Hawaiians in
order to generate operating funds.”).
248. See Rod Ohira, Homestead Improvement: New Community Has Costlier Housing
but Retains Neighborliness of Old Hawai‘i, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan. 28, 2001, at A1,
A5 (describing the difficulty of designing and constructing on Kalawahine Valley homestead
land because of the topography).
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In 1978, delegates to the state constitutional convention sought to
enshrine in the highest law of the land a requirement to adequately fund
DHHL to address issues that even as of that time plagued progress of the
homesteading program.249 The delegates proposed amending the Hawai‘i
Constitution to include a provision, article XII, section 1, for the
administration of the HHCA:
The legislature shall make sufficient sums available for the
following purposes: (1) development of home, agriculture, farm
and ranch lots; (2) home, agriculture, aquaculture, farm and
ranch loans; (3) rehabilitation projects to include, but not limited
to, educational, economic, political, social and cultural processes
by which the general welfare and conditions of native Hawaiians
are thereby improved; (4) the administration and operating
budget of [DHHL]; in furtherance of (1), (2), (3), and (4) herein,
by appropriating the same in the manner provided by law. 250
The framers believed that this constitutional mandate was necessary to “no
longer allow” legislative discretion in funding DHHL. Fed up with the
State’s inaction, the framers noted:
[I]n the 57 years since passage of the Act, less than 12-1/2
percent (25,000 acres) of the total “available lands” (200,000
acres) have actually been disposed of to native Hawaiians. This
averages about 435 acres of Hawaiian home lands per annum. At
that rate, it would take over 400 years to lease the remaining
175,000 acres to native Hawaiians; by the year 2378 the last
square foot of available land will be awarded to a native
Hawaiian. Nearly 25 generations will have passed before the
goal of the HHCA is fully realized.
The department was established by the [HHCA] to provide a
means to rehabilitate its beneficiaries through a series of projects
249. Delegates to the 1978 Hawai‘i constitutional convention approved, and voters
ratified, a series of constitutional amendments that advanced Native Hawaiian rights, culture,
and language. See Andrade, Hawai‘i ‘78, supra note 1, at 130 n.361. Ratified constitutional
amendments included a mandate all public school students have access to a curriculum that
includes an understanding of Hawaiian culture, history, and language, a law requiring that
the Hawaiian language be made an official language of the state, and the creation of the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs—a state agency charged with bettering the conditions of
Hawai‘i’s indigenous people. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. X, § 4; HAW. CONST. art. XII, §§
5–7; HAW. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
250. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (emphasis added).
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and yet was given very little financial assistance to perfect its
mandate. 251
Delegate and Chairwoman of the Hawaiian Affairs Committee, Aunty
Frenchy DeSoto, put it succinctly: “The identifiable problem areas were—
first, that [DHHL]—which provides a land base, has a monumental and
eternal dilemma in funding[.]”252 Compounding the problem, DHHL was
the only state department of seventeen that needed to lease its own land “to
generate revenues to support its administrative and operating budget.” 253
Thus, the framers envisioned article XII, section 1, as providing DHHL
with monies for administrative and program costs, thereby “releasing”
DHHL from the need to lease lands to raise department operating costs and
allowing DHHL to focus on leasing to beneficiaries. 254 The amendment,
which was ratified by the multi-ethnic voters of Hawai‘i, also mandated that
the legislature provide “sufficient sums” for DHHL to develop land, create
and manage rehabilitation projects, and to cover administrative costs.255
The constitutional mandate, however, was still not enough for
policymakers to act. For nearly a decade following the 1978 constitutional
convention, the State “failed to appropriate a single dollar of general fund
revenues, generated from its various general and special tax revenue
sources, to pay for the operation and programs of [DHHL] and its
homesteading program.”256 The legislature did not appropriate
approximately $1.2 million to cover half of DHHL’s budget for
administrative staffing until 1987.257 The following table details the

251. Hawaiian Affairs Comm., Standing Committee Report No. 56, reprinted in 1
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 628, 631
(Honolulu: State of Haw. 1980) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS],
https://digitalcollections.hawaii.gov/docs/concon/1978/1978%20Con%20Con%20Journal%2
0Vol-1%20Journal.pdf.
252. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n (Nelson I), 277 P.3d 279, 293 (Haw. 2012)
(quoting Debates in the Committee of the Whole on Hawaiian Affairs Comm. Prop. No. 11,
in 1 Proceedings at 410); see also id. (statement of Delegate Ontai) (“[DHHL] was woefully
lacking in funds at its inception, and for the past 50 years and even today, it lacks funds to
run the department properly, lacks funds to construct homes and facilities necessary to
service existing and future applicants.”) (quoting Debates in the Committee of the Whole on
Hawaiian Affairs Comm. Prop. No. 11, supra, at 422).
253. See CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 251, at 631.
254. Id. at 632.
255. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
256. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 246 P.3d 369, 371 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011).
257. See DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 17–20 (1989).
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legislative general funds appropriations for DHHL between 1991 and
2013:258
TABLE B. DHHL Appropriated Funds 1991-2013
Fiscal Year
1991-1992
1992-1993
1993-1994
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002
2002-2003
2003-2004
2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
2007-2008
2008-2009
2009-2010
2010-2011
2011-2012
2012-2013

Legislative General
Funds Appropriation
$4,278,706
$3,850,727
$3,251,162
$3,251,162
$2,565,951
$1,569,838
$1,493,016
$1,347,684
$1,298,554
$1,298,554
$1,359,546
$1,196,452
$1,297,007
$1,277,007
$817,559
$1,067,559
$1,169,174
$883,699
$0
$0
$0
$0

As shown above, in 2009, and for the next four years, Republican
governor Linda Lingle, Democratic governor Neil Abercrombie, and the
legislature provided no general funds for DHHL’s operating and

258. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 9–10, Nelson v. Hawaiian
Homes Comm’n, No. 07-1-1663-08 (JHC) (Nov. 27, 2015), https://dhhl.hawaii.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/FOF_COL_-_Decision.pdf.
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administrative costs. DHHL thereby covered its operating and
administrative costs from its general leasing program. 259
Given the abysmal record of funding, native Hawaiian beneficiaries
Richard Nelson III, Kaliko Chun, James Akiona, Sr., Sherilyn Adams, Kelii
Ioane, Jr., and Charles Aipia filed suit against DHHL and the State. 260 They
were represented by the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, an
organization created during the height of the Hawaiian renaissance and the
work of community advocates like Pae Galdeira and many others. 261
Through their suit, these beneficiaries sought to hold the State accountable
for its failure to provide “sufficient sums” to support, as articulated in the
constitution: (1) the development of home, agriculture, farm, and ranch lots;
(2) home, agriculture, aquaculture, farm, and ranch loans; (3) rehabilitation
projects; and (4) DHHL’s administration and operating budget. 262 The State
argued that it had no trust obligation to fund DHHL and that the
beneficiaries’ claim to obligate the legislature to provide “sufficient sums”
to DHHL was barred by the political question doctrine, a judicial tool that
allows a court to punt on making a decision in a legal dispute if that court’s
decision encroached on powers of the other political branches. 263 The State
further argued that the court had no standards to determine what constituted
“sufficient sums” for the aforementioned purposes—a determination that
could only be made by the legislative branch. 264 The trial court ruled in
favor of the State and the beneficiaries appealed to the Hawai‘i
Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”). 265
259. See Act of June 29, 2009, No. 162, § 3, 2009 Haw. Sess. Laws 494, 510, https://
www.capitol.hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH2009/SLH2009_Act162.pdf (showing appropriations
to DHHL to come from special funds, the general obligation bond fund, other federal funds,
and trust funds).
260. Nelson I, 277 P.3d 279, 285 (Haw. 2012).
261. Andrade, Hawai‘i ‘78, supra note 1, at 109 n.175.
262. Nelson I, 277 P.3d at 285.
263. Id. at 285–86.
264. See Motion for Summary Judgment, Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, No.
1CC07166308 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2008), 2008 WL 11415909 (“As explained in detail
below, there are no judicially discoverable or manageable standards for evaluating whether a
particular level of legislative funding to DHHL satisfies any obligation imposed by Article
XII, Section 1, and any attempt to resolve that question would require resort to non-judicial
policy determinations.”); Nelson I, 277 P.3d at 286 n.5 (“The State and DHHL defendants
continued to counter-argue that what constituted ‘sufficient sums’ remained a political
question; they also argued that the holding of the Hanabusa case is limited to the context of
gubernatorial appointments. The circuit court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider by
order dated March 17, 2009.”).
265. Id. at 286.
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In its January 2011 decision, the ICA reversed the decision and
concluded that the determination of “sufficient sums” was a not a political
question. 266 The ICA further found that, among other things, DHHL’s 1976
General Plan “provided ‘initial policy determinations’ and set forth
‘judicially discoverable and manageable standards’ by which ‘sufficient
sums’ can be determined[.]”267 The State appealed to the Hawai‘i Supreme
Court.
In a damning condemnation of the State, Associate Justice Sabrina S.
McKenna, writing for a unanimous Court, declared in Nelson I that:
The State has failed, by any reasonable measure, under the
undisputed facts, to provide sufficient funding to DHHL. The
State’s track record in supporting DHHL’s success is poor, as
evidenced by the tens of thousands of qualified applicants on the
waiting lists and the decades-long wait for homestead lots. With
the benefit of 35–90 years of hindsight, it is clear that DHHL is
underfunded and has not been able to fulfill all of its
constitutional purposes.268
The Court affirmed the ICA’s decision in part and concluded that “the 1978
Constitutional Convention history provides judicially discoverable and
manageable standards, as well as initial policy determinations, as to what
constitutes ‘sufficient sums’ for DHHL’s administrative and operating
expenses only[.]”269 According to the Court, the constitutional framer’s
intent was “clear” to “require appropriation of ‘sufficient sums’ to relieve
DHHL of the burden of general leasing its lands to generate administrative
and operating funds . . . .”270 The Court held, however, that the judicial
branch could not determine “sufficient funds” for the “development of
home, agriculture, farm and ranch lots” unless it could determine how many
lots needed to be developed in a certain period of time. 271 In a separate
ruling on attorneys’ fees, Justice McKenna again clarified that “the State
now must fund DHHL’s administrative and operating expenses. As a result,
DHHL will be able to shift the funds it was spending on administrative and
operating expenses towards fulfilling its trust duties to its beneficiaries.” 272
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 246 P.3d 369, 377–79 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 377–78.
Nelson I, 277 P.3d at 299 (emphases added).
Id. at 282.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 299.
Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 307 P.3d 142, 147 (Haw. 2013).
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In a victory for the beneficiaries, the state’s highest court sent the case back
to the trial court to address the justiciable issue of determining what
constituted “sufficient sums” for DHHL’s administrating and operating
costs.273
The case, on remand, returned to trial judge Jeannette H. Castagnetti. 274
After briefing and arguments by the parties, an eight-day non-jury trial, and
the collection of extensive testimony of multiple witnesses, on November
27, 2015, Judge Castagnetti issued a Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law,
and Order. She concluded:
[T]he Hawaiian Homes Commission and [DHHL] owe a
fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the [HHCA] to pursue the
funding that [DHHL] needs for its administrative and operating
expenses, and prior to 2012, [DHHL] and the Commission failed
to pursue adequate funding from the legislature, thereby
breaching their fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiffs, as beneficiaries
of the [HHCA]. 275
Judge Castagnetti determined that the State must “fulfill their constitutional
duties and trust responsibilities” and that “sufficient sums” of
approximately $28 million were necessary to fund the administrative and
operating costs of DHHL for fiscal years 2015-2016.276
While celebrated by the beneficiaries, Judge Castagnetti’s decision was
rebuked by the state’s governor, Senate president, and House speaker—all
of whom believed that the judiciary had exceeded its authority and could
not order the political branches of the government to make a specified
appropriation.277 The legislature intervened in the lawsuit and sought to
make clear that Judge Castagnetti’s decision “impinge[d] on the legislative
prerogative over the passage of laws and the power to appropriate by
bypassing the legislative branch and process and ordering the appropriation
of funds to [DHHL] for its administrative and operating budget.” 278 Judge
Castagnetti denied the request to reconsider her decision and stated: “The
273. Nelson I, 277 P.3d at 299.
274. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, supra note 258, at 1.
275. Id. at 3.
276. Id. at 39.
277. Chad Blair, Judge: State Must Fund Hawaiian Home Lands, HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT
(Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.civilbeat.org/2016/03/judge-state-must-fund-hawaiian-homelands/.
278. Memorandum of the Hawaii Legislature as Amicus Curiae in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration of, or to Alter or Amend, the Judgment and Order at 3, Nelson v. Hawaiian
Homes Comm’n, No. 1CC07166308 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Feb. 16, 2016), 2016 WL 11201224.
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Hawaii Constitution mandates or requires the State, the Legislature, to act
to make sufficient sums available to DHHL for its administrative and
operating budget by appropriating same in the manner provided by law.
There’s no discretion . . . .”279 To address the legislature’s attempt to silence
the judiciary, Judge Castagnetti bravely remarked that the court “takes
seriously a claim of a constitutional foul or the [c]ourt overstepping its
bounds by any co-equal branch of government, just as I would hope that
any other co-equal branch of government would take seriously courts
stating that the State has not lived up to its constitutional duties.” 280 The
State appealed the decision.281
While the appeal was pending before the Hawai‘i Supreme Court,
legislators in the 2017 session curiously began introducing legislation that
directly impacted state judges. One proposal sought to revise the judicial
retention process, which was considered the “gold standard” of judicial
merit-selection processes in the country. 282 Another bill sought to reduce
pension benefits for judges.283 These bills were widely seen as political
retaliation against the judiciary for Judge Castagnetti’s decision in
Nelson.284 The legislature was, according to an attorney, “exert[ing]
inordinate and unprecedented pressure over the Judiciary to rule on cases in
a certain way.”285
The pressure apparently worked. In 2018, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court
issued its decision in Nelson II. Justice McKenna, writing for the majority,
279. Transcript at 10, Nelson, No. 1CC07166308 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Feb. 16, 2016).
280. Id. at 11.
281. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n (Nelson II), 412 P.3d 917 (Haw. 2018),
reconsideration denied, No. SCAP-16-0000496, 2018 WL 1004727 (Haw. Feb. 21, 2018).
282. See Editorial, Protect Integrity of Judicial Selection, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER,
Feb. 4, 2017, at A6; S.B. 328, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/
session2017/bills/SB328_.htm (“Amendment to Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution of
the State of Hawaii to Amend the Timeframe to Renew the Term of Office of a Justice or
Judge and Require Consent of the Senate for a Justice or Judge to Renew a Term of
Office”); S.B. 673, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2017/
bills/SB673_.htm (“Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Hawaii to Amend the
Manner in Which Justices and Judges are Appointed, Consented to, and Retained”).
283. S.B. 249, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2017/bills/
SB249_.HTM (“Relating to Retirement”).
284. Stewart Yerton, House Speaker: Really, Judges Are My BFFs, HONOLULU CIVIL
BEAT (Jan. 29, 2019) https://www.civilbeat.org/2019/01/house-speaker-really-judges-aremy-bffs/; see also Sara Hayden, Electing the Bench: Analysis of the Possible Negative
Effects of Judicial Elections on Hawai‘i’s Legal Community, 18 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J.
114, 142–44 (2016).
285. See Yerton, supra note 284.
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backpedaled on the clear mandate of Nelson I. In Nelson II, the majority
vacated Judge Castagnetti’s decision because she “erred by engaging in a
comprehensive inquiry into the amount DHHL actually needed for its
administrative and operating expenses.”286 According to the majority:
“Under Nelson I, the only judicially discoverable and manageable standard
for determining ‘sufficient sums’ for DHHL’s administrative and operating
budget was established by the delegates of the 1978 Constitutional
Convention as $1.3 to 1.6 million, adjusted for inflation.” 287 Despite Nelson
I’s thorough analysis of the framer’s “clear” intent in 1978 to mandate that
the legislature provide sufficient sums to administer DHHL, in the end, all
the Court apparently meant in Nelson I as reinterpreted in Nelson II was
that the trial court could “determine the current value of $1.3 to 1.6 million
(in 1978), adjusted for inflation.”288 In other words, the only amount the
trial court could order had to be based on a funding level (with inflation) of
DHHL from 1978, which did not account for such future expenses like
addressing the growing waiting list, and the additional staffing necessary to
support additional beneficiaries being placed on homesteads. In reality,
“sufficient sums” for DHHL’s operations, under the rationale in Nelson II,
covered only approximately one quarter of actual administrative and
operating expenses for the agency. 289
The Court’s delicate balancing act was no doubt a cautious position that
sought to balance the need for judicial oversight with the growing political
pressure the judicial branch faced from an openly hostile legislature. State
Senate Majority Leader J. Kalani English acknowledged the spat between
the judicial and legislative branches:
They did some rulings that we thought was stepping into the
legislative arena. They were trying to legislate from the bench.
We control the purse strings. We said ‘no’ to a lot of their
money. They reversed some of their decisions. We gave them
some money. So the tension worked. 290
The political pressure, however, did not deter Justice Michael D. Wilson
from authoring a blistering dissent that challenged nearly all facets of the
majority’s reinterpretation of their own decision in Nelson I.291 For Justice
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Nelson II, 412 P.3d at 918.
Id.
Id. at 919.
See id. at 948 n.21 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
See Yerton, supra note 284.
Nelson II, 412 P.3d at 928–51 (Wilson, J., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol46/iss1/2

No. 1]

THE HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION ACT

53

Wilson, “an explicit constitutional command of the people ha[d] gone
unheeded[,]” and the majority’s decision narrowly construed Nelson I “in a
manner inconsistent with the constitutional obligation at stake . . . .”292 He
concluded that Judge Castagnetti was wholly within her authority to engage
in an inquiry into the current administrative and operating expenses of
DHHL as set forth in Nelson I.293
Although the Court’s majority undercut its own mandate, the decadelong fight over adequate funding finally appeared to take a turn. The Nelson
litigation educated the community and policymakers and provided the
legislature with the motivation to address some of the funding gaps within
DHHL. For example, in each of the fiscal years 2013-2014, 2014-2015, and
2015-2016, the legislature appropriated $9,632,000 to cover administrative
and operating expenses.294 In fiscal year 2020-2021, the legislature
appropriated $18,644,280 to cover DHHL’s administrative and operating
expenses. While the state’s injection of funding to support the
administration of DHHL will hopefully allow the agency to move forward
with homestead development projects and chip away at the waiting list, the
amounts still pale in comparison to what is needed. Is this what Kūhiō
envisioned as justice?
IV. Belated Justice
At every step along the 100-year journey of the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act, Hawaiians have been fighting for what they are already
entitled to under the law. Generation after generation faced new legal
challenges and new political realities. From the beginning, a Congress
heavily influenced by white sugar and ranching interests in Hawai‘i, created
a law that undermined Hawaiian sovereignty and rights in the Crown and
Government lands of the Kingdom. Simultaneously, Congress limited who
could benefit from these lands by employing racist blood quantum
requirements. Although not perfect, the HHCA provided a minimum level
of protection for some Hawaiians. Yet, as of this writing, while nearly
10,000 individuals have been lucky enough to obtain a homestead, over
28,000 more wait for the state and federal government to find the political
292. Id. at 929.
293. Id.
294. The annual amount that would, at a minimum, constitute “sufficient sums” under the
majority’s view in Nelson II was approximately $1.6 million adjusted for inflation, or
approximately 35% of what the legislature actually appropriated annually to DHHL from
2013 to 2016. Id. at 948 n.21.
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will to truly implement the rehabilitative purposes of the law. If the pace of
providing 10,000 homestead leases in the last 100 years continues, it will be
an unacceptable 280 years before the current list is cleared.
The HHCA’s centennial is an important opportunity to recalibrate the
relationship between the federal government, the State of Hawai‘i, and
native Hawaiian beneficiaries. While not exhaustive, the following list of
proposals may help to frame the next century of the HHCA in a way that
will provide the justice that Kūhiō envisioned by returning ‘āina to
Hawaiians and supporting Hawaiian self-determination.
First, and as a foundation, all stakeholders should be educated about the
HHCA, its origins, and the government’s trust responsibilities as set forth in
the Hawai‘i Constitution. For example, in much the same way that state law
requires members of certain government boards and commissions to receive
training in Native Hawaiian legal issues, 295 state and federal lawmakers
must also receive training on issues relating to the HHCA.
Second, the federal and state governments must provide the necessary
funding and support to ensure the success of the Hawaiian Home Lands
program. 296 DHHL is in need of long-term funding solutions to, among
other things, support the department’s operations, to pay for necessary
infrastructure to develop more lots, and to provide loans for beneficiaries. 297
Relatedly, lawmakers must also address the current funding structure for
DHHL that relies too heavily on general leasing. In addition, although the
Hawai‘i Constitution requires the state legislature to provide sufficient
sums to support the program, there is nothing precluding other state
agencies from supporting the homesteading goal. The shortcomings of the
State in its role as trustee can be remedied if the governor required other

295. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 10-41, 10-42 (2015) (requiring certain state councils,
boards, and commission to attend a legal training course on Hawaiian customs and rights).
296. DHHL is the designated recipient for annual funds from the Native American
Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act. 25 U.S.C. § 4222(a).
297. In 2021, because the state was not providing adequate funding, DHHL proposed that
the government authorize the creation of a casino on Hawaiian Home Lands to address the
agencies funding shortfall. H.B. 359, 31st Leg. (Haw. 2021), https://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/session2021/bills/HB359_.htm; S.B. 1321, 31st Leg. (Haw. 2021), https://www.
capitol.hawaii.gov/session2021/bills/SB1321_.htm. The revenue generating idea was met
with immediate resistance from the state governor and many legislators. In 2022, state
legislators introduced a bill that would provide a one-time $600 million infusion into the
Hawaiian Home Lands program. H.B. 2511, 31st Leg. (Haw. 2022), https://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/session2022/bills/HB2511_SD2_.htm. As of the writing of this Article, the bill
has not yet become law.
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state agencies to fully cooperate with ensuring the success of the DHHL in
implementing the HHCA.
Third, the federal government should continue to take a more active role
in holding the State to account for its trust failures. In 2016, the U.S.
Department of the Interior implemented two additional regulations
pertaining to the HHCA that implied that the federal government would be
actively involved in ensuring that the trust is properly carried out. 298 These
administrative rules clarified federal involvement in the Hawaiian Home
Lands program and left interesting avenues available for the federal
government to interject to either advance or stymie rehabilitation efforts. 299
When combined with President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s recent executive
order advancing equity, justice, and opportunity for native Hawaiians,
among others, the federal government seems primed to intervene to assist
beneficiaries. 300
Fourth, state and federal lawmakers must work together to update the
HHCA to conform it to the needs and reality of the twenty first century.
These updates could include, but are not limited to, eliminating or
modifying the blood quantum requirement for applicants and successors,
and upgrading DHHL’s information management and record system.
Recently, In 2021, U.S. Congressman Kaiali‘i Kahele introduced House
Joint Resolution 55, titled the Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalaniana‘ole Protecting
Family Legacies Act, which would provide congressional consent for the
state’s 2017 amendments to the HHCA to lower the blood quantum
298. Land Exchange Procedures and Procedures to Amend the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act, 1920, 81 Fed. Reg. 29776, 29788 (May 13, 2016) (codified at 43 C.F.R.
pt. 47) (providing clear and concise “procedures for conducting land exchanges of Hawaiian
home lands authorized by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920 (HHCA)”); id. at
29791 (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 47) (creating procedures for the Secretary of the Department
of Interior to review amendments proposed by the State of Hawai‘i regarding the HHCA).
Before the State of Hawai‘i can officially put new amendments into the HHCA, the
Department of Interior must approve them first. Id.
299. See Lehua Kinilau-Cano & Hokulei Lindsey, Problems in Interior’s Rule on
Hawaiian Home Lands, HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT, (July 11, 2016) https://www.
civilbeat.org/2016/07/problems-in-interiors-rule-on-hawaii-home-lands/ (“What the rule
actually does is extend the authority of the federal government in significant ways and at the
same time stops short of ensuring the United States fulfills its duty as trustee of public lands
transferred to the state at the time of statehood.”).
300. Exec. Order No. 14,031, 86 Fed. Reg. 29675 (May 28, 2021) (“The purpose of this
order is to build on those policies by establishing the President’s Advisory Commission on
Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders and the White House Initiative on
Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders. Both will work to advance
equity, justice, and opportunity for AA and NHPI communities in the United States.”).
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requirement of successors. With Hawai‘i’s U.S. Senator Brian Schatz at the
helm of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, the time seems ripe to get
federal support for updates to the HHCA.
Finally, and most importantly, solutions to the woes of the HHCA should
include consultation with native Hawaiian beneficiaries. The beneficiaries
have held the government accountable for years—in the state Capitol
during Aloha Week, on the slopes of Parker Ranch, and in courtrooms.
Countless reports and successful lawsuits demonstrate the important role
that beneficiaries have played and will continue to play in the success of the
Hawaiian Home Lands program. To this end, there must be greater
beneficiary involvement in the implementation of the law as the HHCA
provides a clear vehicle for Hawaiian self-determination.301
Now is the time to reimagine what the next century will look like for the
HHCA. Now is the time for providing true justice.

301. Indeed, the state legislature passed laws supporting self-sufficiency and selfdetermination of native Hawaiians. In 1990, Act 349, for example, provided a new section of
the HHCA to include the State’s “support self-sufficiency . . . and the self determination of
native Hawaiians in the administration of [the] Act.” Act of July 11, 1990, No. 349, § 1,
1990 Haw. Sess. Laws 1075, 1075, https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH1990/
SLH1990_Act349.pdf. In 2001, the state legislature passed Act 302, which had a policy
promoting self-determination among homestead beneficiaries. Act of June 28, 2001, No.
302, 2001 Haw. Sess. Laws 879, https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/slh/Years/SLH2001/
SLH2001_Act302.pdf. Act 302 further provided the Hawaiian Homes Commission the
authority to “establish a working relationship with a democratically-elected Hawaiian
homestead community self-governance organization to promote community welfare [to
HHCA].” Id. § 2, 2001 Haw. Sess. Laws at 881; see also Procedures for Reestablishing a
Formal Government-to-Government Relationship with the Native Hawaiian Community, 81
Fed. Reg. 71278, 71291 (Oct. 14, 2016) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 50) (establishing a set of
procedures to reestablish a government-to-government relationship with the native Hawaiian
community and noting that “the Native Hawaiian community’s ability to more effectively
exercise its inherent sovereignty and self-determination as an additional purpose of the
rule”).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol46/iss1/2

